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TARGET LISTS: A 1923 IDEA WITH APPLICATIONS FOR
THE FUTURE t
Herman Reinhold
tt
NEW YORK TIMES, December 15, 2005, Page IA:
CLINTON INDICTED FOR HUMANITARIAN CRIMES
AMSTERDAM, Netherlands - President Clinton was indicted today by
the International Criminal Court for the 1998 missile attack on a Sudan
medicine factory. If convicted of crimes against humanity, he faces life
in prison. President George Bush's recent conviction for the 1991
Baghdad air raid shelter bombing...
Will United States officials be indicted, tried and convicted for bomb-
ing raids? The international legal community is continually developing the
concepts of crimes against humanity, war crimes and command responsi-
bility for these crimes. In the future, these crimes could be tried in the
proposed International Criminal Court.' U.S. target selection is often
f
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense or the
U.S. government.t A.A., Columbia-Greene Community College; B.A., State University of New York at
Albany; J.D., School of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo; LL.M., The Judge
Advocate General's School of the U.S. Army. He is a Major in the United States Air
Force, assigned to 5th Air Force, Yokota Air Base, Japan. He is a member of the New
York bar. This article was written for his LL.M. program. Major Michael Lac :y (U.S.
Army) suggested the topic. Major Jeanne Meyer (U.S.A.F.) advised on the outline and
revisions.
1. See Marcella David, Grotius Repudiated: The American Objections to the Interna-
tional Criminal Court and the Commitment to International Law, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 337
(1999). President Clinton signed the war crimes tribunal treaty on Dec. 31, 2000, with
concerns about treaty flaws. See Thomas E. Ricks, U.S. Signs Treaty on War Crimes
Tribunal, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2001, at Al. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, available at www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99-corr/cstatute.htm (last visited Feb. 9,
2001). For analysis of the proposed court, see 167 MIL. L. REv. (2001), with articles by
Ambassador David C. Scheffer, Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Newton and Major
Michael L. Smidt. This paper focuses on the legality of targets under international law.
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controversial. The hypothetical news story has just two incidents when
2
national and world media criticized U.S. target selection. However, the
U.S. is often criticized for selecting some bombing targets and for not
selecting other targets.3
Is there a way for the U.S. and other nations to select targets to mini-
mize criticism? What if nations agreed on target lists in advance? Would
such a list have other benefits? This article proposes the U.S. and other
nations adopt a uniform target list as guidance for future bombing. A
general target list, accepted in advance of any conflict, would limit criticism
and build consensus in the international community that certain targets are
appropriate. Such a consensus would make coalition military operations
more efficient and build stronger coalitions for international actions. In
particular, this article discusses the target list in Article 24(2) of the
Whether a target is best politically, strategically, operationally, tactically, morally, or for
public relations purposes are different but related subjects.
2. For criticism of the Sudan attack, see Tim Weiner & Steven Lee Myers, After The
Attacks: The Overview; Flaws in U.S. Account Raise Questions on Strike in Sudan, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 1998, at Al; David Hirst, U.S. Missile Raids: Factory Rubble Yields No Sign
of Arms, GUARDIAN, Aug. 24, 1998, at 2. For criticism of the Baghdad attack, see
KENNETH L. VAUX, ETHICS AND THE GULF WAR 28-31 (1992); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
NEEDLESS DEATHS IN THE GULF WAR 6-8, 128 (1991); RAMSEY CLARK, THE FIRE THIS
TIME 70-72, 83, 180 (1992); Tragedy in Baghdad; 500 Killed In Shelter, Iraq Says; U.S. Calls
Target Military; Highest Toll of Civilians in Gulf War, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1991, at P1.
3. For criticism of World War II bombing, see JOHN BUCKLEY, AIR POWER IN THE AGE
OF TOTAL WAR 163 (1999); HIROSHIMA'S SHADOW: WRITINGS ON THE DENIAL OF HISTORY
AND THE SMITHSONIAN CONTRAVERSY (Kai Bird & Lawrence Lifschultz eds., 1998); HOITO
EDOIN, THE NIGHT TOKYO BURNED (1987); Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The
Legitimization of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49,
86-90 (1994); Simon Jenkins, Dresden: Time To Say We're Sorry, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 1995.
After the Korean War, critics felt properly used air power could have won the war. EARL
H. TILFORD, JR., SETUP: WHAT THE AIR FORCE DID IN VIETNAM AND WHY 18-21 (1991).
During and since the Vietnam War, there has been controversy over what was or was not
bombed and the entire targeting process. See id. at 75, 79, 82, 89, 109; Telford Taylor,
Defining War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1973, at 39; W. Hays Parks, Rules of
Engagement: No More Vietnams, PROCEEDINGS, Mar. 1991, at 27-28; Lt. Col. John G.
Humphries, Operations Law and the Rules of Engagement in Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm, VI AIRPOWER J., No. 3, 25 (1992); Christopher Hitchens, The Case Against
Henry Kissinger Part I: The Making of a War Criminal, HARPER'S MAG., Feb. 2001, at 42-
53. For criticism of U.S. incendiary bomb use in World War II, Korea and Vietnam, see
STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INCENDIARY WEAPONS 30-63
(1975) [hereinafter SIPRI]. For criticism of the Gulf War, see CLARK, supra note 2;
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2. For criticism of Kosovo bombing, see Amnesty
International, 'Collateral Damage' or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Law of War by
NATO During Operation Allied Force (June 6, 2001), available at www.amnesty.org
[hereinafter Al Report], which says, "whatever their intentions-NATO forces did commit
serious violations of the laws of war leading... to the unlawful killings of civilians." Id.
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proposed Hague Rules of Air Warfare of 1923.' This article also discusses
the guidance of Articles 22 to 24 of those rules.
I. INTRODUCTION
Almost since the inception of aerial bombing, critics have focused on
target selection and criticized it in different ways. General criticisms
include the bombing of inappropriate or illegal targets, environmental
damage, and, the "excessive use of force" with nuclear weapons or
firebombing. In Kosovo operations, NATO was criticized for striking
several targets, including vehicle convoys with civilians, passenger trains
with civilians, a Serbian radio and television station, the Chinese Embassy,
factories and refineries, and, a village Amnesty International, Yugoslavia
and others accused the NATO nations of war crimes because of theS6
Kosovo bombing campaign. Criticisms of some of these strikes led to the
establishment of a committee to assess allegations against NATO and
report to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia
NATO strikes in Yugoslavia reminded people of other wars while
highlighting the possible environmental harm to the region.8 The damage
4. See Hague Rules of Air Warfare, Drafted by A Commission of Jurists at The Hague
(1922-1923), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLIcrs 207 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri
Toman eds., 1988) [hereinafter 1923 Air Rules]. See infra Appendix, arts. 22-24.
5. See Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NA TO
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, available at
http://www.un.orglictylpressreallnato06l300.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2001) [hereinafter
Final Report]. The report was written for the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia and said no further investigation was needed because "either the
law is not sufficiently clear or investigations are unlikely to result in" enough evidence to
support charges. Id.
6. See Al Report, supra note 3; Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, at http://www.gov.yu
(last visited Feb. 12, 2001); Kosovo: Is NATO Guilty of War Crimes?, available at
http://www.newsvote.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/talking-point/newsid 781000/781165.stm. (last
visited Feb. 9, 2001). The BBC News site has comments from over thirty people from ten
different nations. Some supported NATO's actions in Kosovo, while others felt NATO was
guilty of war crimes.
7. See Final Report, supra note 5.
8. See Ida L. Bostian, Hazardous Materials and Energy: The Environmental
Consequences of the Kosovo Conflict and the NATO Bombing of Serbia, 1999 COLO. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 230, 230. See also Aaron Schwabach, Environmental Damage Resulting
from the NATO Action Against Yugoslavia, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L- 117 (2000). For the
Yugoslavian government's perspective, see http://www.gov.yu (last visited Feb. 12, 2001)
(40 pages of details on damage to nature areas, pollution, environmental damage, and
allegations of NATO war crimes).
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brought to mind the oil spills and fires in the Gulf War' and use of
defoliants in the Vietnam War.' NATO strikes resulted in oil and poisons
polluting the Danube, killing fish and carrying toxins to Romania and
Bulgaria.1' Greek authorities were concerned that fires in refineries,
fertilizer and explosives plants would send them airborne toxins."2
Criticism of U.S. bombing from previous wars is often found in the
news. 3  The atomic bomb and firebombing of Japan created strong
emotions and long painful memories. When the National Air and Space
Museum, part of Washington D.C.'s Smithsonian Museum, planned an
exhibit of the Enola Gay in 1995, they received over 30,000 pieces of angry
mail, causing the Museum Director to resign and the Senate to hold
hearings. 14
Many remembered the bombing of Dresden and German cities when
a statue honored Sir "Bomber" Harris in 1992." In October 1992, when
the Queen of England visited Dresden, protestors booed and threw eggs.16
9. See VAUX, supra note 2, at 27, 75, 147.
10. See Bostian, supra note 8, at 2. See also Joseph B. Verrenga & Tini Tran, Agent
Orange's Child Victims Suffering, Nov. 14, 2000, at http://www.counterpunch.org/pipermail
/counterpunch-list/2000-November/003802.html. The U.S. used twenty million gallons of
defoliants in Vietnam from 1962 to 1971. About one million Vietnamese are affected by
exposure, including 150,000 children.
11. See Bostian, supra note 8, at 3.
12. Id.
13. See Bob Thompson, The Museum of the American Century, WASH. POST, Sept. 17,
2000, at 8; Peter Millar, A Royal Header in the Heart of Europe, TIMES (London), Oct. 25,
1992, Features.
14. The Enola Gay, a B-29 bomber, dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima in 1945. See
Joel Achenbach, Enola Gay Exhibit, WASH. POST, June 28, 1995, at Al; Jacqueline
Trescott, Senator Warns Smithsonian on Controversies, WASH. POST, May 19, 1995, at D6.
The controversy continues, see John T. Correll, Strange Stories about Enola Gay: They Just
Keep Coming, A.F. MAG., Nov. 2000, at 16.
15. Harris was head of Britain's Bomber Command in World War II, from 1942 to 1945,
and is "responsible" for the "strategic bombing" of German cities. DUDLEY SAWARD,
BOMBER HARRIS 116 (1985). For reports on the statue, see Anne McElvoy, This is the Real
Memorial, TIMES (London), May 26, 1992, at Features; Roger Boyes, Anniversary of
Bombing Opens "War Crime" Wound, TIMES (London), Feb. 11, 1995, at Overseas News.
Boyes reports Harris is considered "a war criminal" in Dresden. In a Feb. 15, 1995
editorial, Simon Jenkins called firebombing, such as Dresden, "airborne terrorism" that
should be banned. Simon Jenkins, Editorial, Ban Airborne Terrorism, TIMES (London),
Feb. 15, 1995, at Features.
16. See Millar, supra note 13. For a photo of the demonstration, see TIMES (London)
Oct. 23, 1992.
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Others remember Hiroshima and Nagasaki as peace protestors use those
anniversaries to protest nuclear weapons, the military, or both.7
Criticism of bombing is also found in popular literature and films.
The book, Slaughterhouse-Five, by Kurt Vonnegut, told of the Dresden
bombing and was made into a movie. Joseph Heller's book, Catch-22, also
made into a film, tells the war experiences of a bombardier with dark
humor and satire. The recent film Three Kings criticized Gulf War
bombing by highlighting the death and injury of civilians and the
destruction of the businesses of anti-Hussein rebels. 18
Perhaps there is a way to reduce criticism of U.S. bombing and work
consistently and effectively with our allies within the Law of War. This
article will show the development of the Law of War through conventions
and the practice and customs of nations. Conventions, treaties and
comments by national leaders illustrate international law. However, U.S.
actions in wartime show real world applications of the Law of War.
Through time, the actions and customs of nations can become accepted
international law standards or opinio juris. Acts by nations at war also
show how practice in warfare often conflicts with the pronouncements of
national leaders. This article will show the Law of War in both word and
deed.19 The article will also discuss the 1923 Air Rules, why the U.S should
adopt them, and how they contrast with the status quo of U.S. targeting.
Adoption of the 1923 Air Rules by the U.S. and others would be a
significant advance in the Law of War that could limit criticism while
building consensus in NATO for future operations. In the alternative, the
17. From 1987 to 1989, the author was a Judge Advocate and Special Assistant U.S.
Attorney at Griffiss Air Force Base, Rome, N.Y. Peace protestors would march and
trespass there on Hiroshima Day, and be tried in U.S. Magistrate's Court in Syracuse. The
start of the protests predated the author's service by several years.
18. See KURT VONNEGUT, JR., SLAUGHTERHOUSE-FIVE (1969); SLAUGHTERHOUSE-FIVE
(Universal Pictures 1972); JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (1955); CATCH-22 (Paramount
Pictures 1970); THREE KINGS (Warner Brothers 1999).
19. The U. S. Department of Defense and Army use the term "Law of War" while the
Air Force and Navy say "Law of Armed Conflict" (LOAC). See CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSTRUCTION 5810.01, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DEP'T OF DEFENSE LAW
OF WAR PROGRAM (Aug. 12, 1996); INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPART-
MENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW
HANDBOOK, Chapter 2 (2001); OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3300.52, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
(LAW OF WAR) PROGRAM TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE BY THE U.S. NAVY AND NAVAL
RESERVE (18 Mar. 1983) [OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK]. The International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) uses "International Humanitarian Law" in its publications. See
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, ICRC: SELECTED PUBLICATIONS 46
(1997). See also INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, at http://www.icrc.org
(last visited Feb 9, 2001).
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U.S. and NATO could adopt the 1923 Air Rules as a basis for NATO or
coalition operations as a matter of policy, while trying to maintain the
flexibility of the status quo.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Preliminary History and General Principles of the Law of War
When the airplane was invented, the Law of War (or the jus in bello)
was already in place. It has been shaped from ancient times through
endless conflicts.2° Like other parts of international law, the Law of War is
both created and evidenced by international treaties, court decisions, and
21
the custom or actions of nations.
The modern era of the Law of War began in the 1860s in the U.S. and
Europe.22 During the U.S. Civil War, Professor Lieber of Columbia
College wrote a code of conduct for Union troops that may be considered
a "restatement" of the laws and customs in effect at the time.2 3 When the
Union Army adopted the Lieber Code, it was the "first modern codifica-
tion of the laws of war to be officially adopted by a warring belligerent.,
24
Subsequently, in Geneva, Switzerland, the International Committee of the
20. See A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 1-3 (1996); HILAIRE MCCOUBREY,
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LIMITATION OF
WARFARE 8-17 (2d ed. 1998); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 28; Jochnick &
Normand, supra note 3, at 52-55.
21. See The Paqete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,
880 (2d Cir. 1980); ROGERS, supra note 20, at 1; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ARMY, FIELD
MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, paras. 4-8 (1956).
22. See MCCOUBREY, supra note 20, at 17; Steven Keeva, Lawyers in the War Room, 77
A.B.A. J. 52, 55 (1991); W. Hays Parks, Air War and The Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 7
(1990).
23. See Francis Lieber, Instructions For The Government of Armies of the U.S. in the
Field, issued as Gen. Orders No. 100 by Pres. Lincoln, Apr. 24, 1863, reprinted in THE LAWS
OF ARMED CONFLIcrs, supra note 4, at 3-23 [hereinafter The Lieber Code]. Lieber taught
law and was a Doctor of Philosophy. Id. He served with the Prussian army in the 1815
Battle of Waterloo. Id. Two of his sons fought for the U. S. and one was a Confederate
soldier. Id. The Code has 157 Articles in ten sections and was given to both U.S. and
Confederate troops in the war. Id. The code refers to the "law of war" or "usages of war"
(arts. 11, 13-14, 27, 33, 52, 60, 90 and 148) and says the law of war has advanced in civilized
nations (arts. 22-30). McCOUBREY, supra note 20, at 18; Ariane L. DeSaussure, The Role
of the Law of Armed Conflict During the Persian Gulf War, 37 A.F. L. REV. 41, 46 (1994);
Parks, supra note 22, at 7-8; Jochnick & Normand, supra note 3, at 65-66.
24. Jochnick & Normand, supra note 3, at 65.
[Vol. 10.1
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Red Cross (ICRC), founded in 1863, issued a Convention for protection of
the wounded in 1864.25
From the 1860s, the Law of War developed in two directions: The
Hague Law and the Geneva Law. However, these sets of laws have much
in common. The Hague Law primarily refers to a series of conventions,
two of the most important being the conventions of 1899 (Hague II) and
1907 (Hague IV) on Laws and Customs of War on Land 6 The Geneva
Law starts with the documents of 1863 and 1864, and then continues with
other treaties relating to the wounded, in 1868, the wounded and sick, in
1906 and 1929, and prisoners of war, in 1929. The most recent conventions
are the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two Protocols of 1977.1
7
The Hague Law and Geneva Law are related, but they have some basic
distinctions.2
The Hague Law focuses on the conduct of warfare: the means and••• 29
methods of war, types and use of weapons, and tactics during hostilities.The Geneva Law focuses on protecting and aiding war victims.30 The four
25. See MCCOUBREY, supra note 20, at 17; Keeva, supra note 22; Resolutions of the
Geneva International Conference, Oct. 26-29, 1863, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS, supra note 4. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded Armies in the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS, supra note 4, at 275.
26. See Hague Convention (II) With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
July 29, 1899, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICI'S, supra note 4 [hereinafter
Hague II]. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Oct. 18, 1907, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 4 [hereinafter
Hague IV].
27. See THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 4. Additional Articles relating to
the Condition of the Wounded in the Field, Oct. 20, 1868; Convention For The
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, July 6,
1906; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armies in the Field, July 27, 1929; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949; Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949 [hereinafter Geneva I]; Convention
(II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949 [hereinafter Geneva II]; Convention (III) Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949 [hereinafter Geneva III]; Convention
(IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949
[hereinafter Geneva IV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
June 8, 1977 [hereinafter Protocol 1]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II), June 8, 1977 [hereinafter Protocol II]. Id.
28. See MCCOUBREY, supra note 20, at 2.
29. See Jochnick & Normand, supra note 3, at 52.
30. Id.
20021
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1949 Geneva Conventions embody the lessons of World War II, with a
focus on victims and preventing suffering.31 The most recent conventions
protect the wounded, sick, shipwrecked, prisoners of war, and civilians.3 2
Certain key concepts are expressed in the Law of War by both tradi-
tion and the treaty laws of The Hague and Geneva. The related concepts
overlap in rules and ideals. The concepts are military necessity, humanity,
distinction or discrimination, and proportionality.33
The Lieber Code defines military necessity as "those measures which
are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful
according to the modern law and usages of law." 4 Soldiers should not kill
or destroy in an orgy of plunder or revenge or hatred. Military actions of
soldiers must be "demanded by the necessities of war."35 While soldiers
must win wars, all acts are not allowed. They must be guided by the
principle of humanity, also called the prohibition against unnecessary
36
suffering. The purpose section of Hague IV explains that even in war we
must serve "the interests of humanity" and both "belligerents and
inhabitants" are protected by the "law of nations" resulting from the
customs of civilized people, and "dictates of the public conscience."37
The rules of military necessity and humanity intersect to create the
concept of distinction or discrimination.- If soldiers may only take actions
31. See Schwabach, supra note 8, at 125.
32. See Geneva I, supra note 27; see Geneva II, supra note 27; see Geneva III, supra note
27; see Geneva IV, supra note 27.
33. See ROGERS, supra note 20, at 3; Stephen A. Myrow, Waging War on the Advice of
Counsel, 7 USAFA J. LEG. STUD. 131,132 (1996/1997).
34. The Lieber Code, supra note 23, art. 14.
35. See ROGERS, supra note 20, at 6; The Lieber Code, supra note 23, arts. 15-16.
36. See DeSaussure, supra note 23, at 46.
37. See Hague IV, supra note 26, pmbl. "Humanity" is well established in the Lieber
Code. The Lieber Code, supra note 23. Art. 16 bans unnecessary suffering and says
"[m]ilitary necessity does not admit of cruelty - that is, the infliction of suffering for the
sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or wounding except in a fight, nor of
torture to extract confessions." See id. art. 16. "Humanity" is related to "chivalry". See
Hague IV, supra note 26, art. 23; ROGERS, supra note 20 at 3. Chivalry requires
"humanitarian safeguards not be subverted by a belligerent to effect purely military goals."
DeSaussure, supra note 23, at 47. Art. 16 of the Lieber Code covers chivalry and says "in
general, military necessity does not include any act of hostility which makes the return to
peace unnecessarily difficult." The Lieber Code, supra note 23. Chivalry is seldom key in
bombing and will not be discussed further. Id.
38. The Lieber Code has distinction in art. 19 ("commanders should let noncombatants
... leave before a bombardment"), art. 22 ("the unarmed citizen is to be spared ... as much
as the exigencies of war will admit."), art. 25, and art. 35 ("[c]lassical works of art, libraries,
scientific collections, or precious instruments, such as astronomical telescopes, as well as
[Vol. 10.1
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to further the war and may not cause unnecessary suffering, then they must
know their targets whenever possible. 9 Soldiers should fight soldiers.
Non-combatants may never be intentionally killed or wounded.40 Civilian
property, cultural property, historical buildings, hospitals, and churches
should not be intentionally destroyed unless there is a valid military
41purpose.
The concept of proportionality is a balance between a soldier's mis-
42
sion and their duty not to cause unnecessary suffering. Proportionality
hospitals, must be secured against all avoidable injury, even when they are contained in
fortified places whilst besieged or bombarded."). The Lieber Code, supra note 23.
39. See ROGERS, supra note 20, at 7.
40. Lieber made it clear war was against an enemy's military. Civilians were "to be
spared in person, property and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit" and were
not to be "murdered, enslaved or carried off .... The Lieber Code, supra note 23, art. 14.
However, civilians might suffer the hardships of war and might be harmed if it was
"incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests of the war." Id. arts. 21-25. Lieber felt
vigorous and "sharp wars" were more brief and better for humanity. Id. art. 29. General
Sherman's Civil War acts show specifically some of the ways war harms civilians and shows
Sherman's analysis of the value of a sharp war. His troops took food, destroyed crops and
burned homes to punish people for "supporting the confederate cause" but he did not kill
civilians. He said, "[I]f the people raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty, I will
answer that war is war, and not popularity seeking. If they want peace, they and their
relatives must stop the war." EDWARD C. HOLLAND III, FIGHTING WITH A CONSCIENCE 3
(1992) (quoting William T. Sherman, MEMOIRS 585 (1990)). "We cannot change the hearts
of those people of the South, but we can make war so terrible... [and] make them so sick of
war that generations would pass away before they would again appeal to it." EDWARD C.
HOLLAND 1It, FIGHTING WITH A CONSCIENCE 3 (1992) (quoting James M. McPherson,
BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 809 (1988)).
41. See ROGERS, supra note 20, at 7-14, 84-105; Parks, supra note 22, at 4, 14, 18. Art. 27
of Hague IV says: "In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare,
as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes,
historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected,
provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes." Hague IV, supra note
26, art. 27. Hague II, Art. 27 protects the same places, except for historic monuments.
Hague II, supra note 26, art. 27. Cultural property is protected by the Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954 reprinted in
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 4, at 745.
42. See William J. Fenrick, Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a Punishable Offense, 7
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 539, 545 (1997); Myrow, supra note 33, at 132. Proportionality
may be "inferred from Arts. 15 and 22 of the Lieber Code and is to be found elsewhere,
such as in the customary rule on reprisals and in the concept of self defense .... " ROGERS,
supra note 20, at 14. See also Protocol I, supra note 27, art. 51 (which bans indiscriminate
attacks, "an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."). Protocol I, Article 51
is considered the "first codification of the customary international law concept of
20021
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means "there must be an acceptable relation between the legitimate
destructive effect and undesirable collateral effects. For example,
bombing a refugee camp is obviously prohibited if its only military
significance is that women in the camp are knitting socks for soldiers.,
43
Another way to look at proportionality is to consider "the reduction of
incidental damage caused by military operations." 44 When considering
proportionality, soldiers should consider how they fight. When possible, a
soldier should attack at times and with means to cause the least amount of
civilian casualties and damage, or may decide not to attack. For example,
it is generally thought to be disproportionate to destroy an entire town to
45kill one sniper.
B. The Application of the Law of War to Aircraft
Law of War principles were well documented by the time aircraft
were invented. However, the aircraft was a unique weapon and analogies
to other weapons of war were often unsatisfactory.4
Some of the concepts and ideas that existed in the Law of War when
aircraft were invented apply to air power, but few are "directly applica-
ble., 47  Some Law of War principles from Hague II and IV apply to
bombing and air power.4 Article 23(g) is the same in both treaties and
forbids destruction of enemy property unless it is "imperatively demanded
by the necessities of war., 49 Hague IV, Article 25 says, "[t]he attack or
bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or
proportionality." Danielle L. Infeld, Precision- Guided Munitions Demonstrated Their
Pinpoint Accuracy in Desert Storm, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 109, 118 (1992).
43. Fenrick, supra note 42, at 545.
44. ROGERS, supra note 20, at 14.
45. Id.; Keeva, supra note 22, at 57; Infeld, supra note 42, at 119.
46. See Elbridge Colby, Aerial Law and War Targets, 19 AM. J. INT'L L. 702, 703 (1925).
The first attempted control of airships as weapons concerned balloons, when a five-year
ban on "the discharge of projectiles and explosives from balloons, or by other new methods
of a similar nature" was adopted at The Hague in 1899. Id. at 703; DeSaussure, supra note
23, at 45; Declaration (IV 1) to Prohibit For The Term of Five Years the Launching of
Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons, and Other Methods of a Similar Nature, July 29,
1899, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 4, at 201.
47. See DeSaussure, supra note 23, at 45.
48. See Infeld, supra note 42, at 114; Hague II, supra note 26; Hague IV, supra note 26.
49. Hague II, supra note 26, art. 23(g); Hague IV, supra note 26, art. 23(g). Art. 23(g) of
both Hague II and IV says it is forbidden "[t]o destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless
such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessity of war." Hague II,
supra note 26, art. 23(g); Hague IV, supra note 26, art. 23(g).
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buildings which are undefended is prohibited."5 ° Hague IV, Article 26
requires that "[tihe officer in command of an attacking force must, before
commencing a bombardment, except in cases of assault, do all in his power
to warn the authorities." Hague IV, Article 27 protects buildings devoted
to religion, art, science, historic monuments, hospitals and the sick and
wounded from bombing, so long as the places are not used for military
52purposes.
The bombing rules of Hague II and IV show the principles of military
necessity and humanity by limiting targets to those required by military
necessity and by protecting certain religious, cultural, and medical
facilities. The Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardment by Naval
Forces in Time of War, signed at The Hague on October 18, 1907, takes a
different approach .
Hague IX, Article 1 forbids the bombardment of undefended "ports,
towns, villages, dwellings or buildings.5 4 However, Article 2 lists specific
targets that are not covered by the prohibition of Article 1, and also seems
to absolve the commander of unintended consequences. 5  Article 5
50. Hague IV, supra note 26, art. 25. Article 25 is identical to Hague II, Art. 25, except
for changing "habitation" to "dwelling" and adding "by whatever means," a term added
deliberately to make air attacks illegal. Colby, supra note 46, at 703. Some say "unde-
fended" means "without military value." Jochnick & Normand, supra note 3, at 72. Parks
says the undefined "undefended" caused confusion, but was not meant to "prohibit the
intentional destruction of any buildings, when military operations rendered it a necessity."
Parks, supra note 22, at 15.
51. Hague IV, supra note 26, art. 26. Hague II, Article 26 says, "The Commander of an
attacking force, before commencing a bombardment, except in the case of an assault,
should do all he can to warn the authorities." Hague II, supra note 26, art. 26.
52. Hague IV, supra note 26, art. 27. Hague IV, Article 27 is almost identical to Hague
II, Art. 27, except for adding "historical monuments." Article 27 also requires a besieged to
show protected buildings by distinctive sign and notify the enemy. McCoubrey comments
on Articles 25-27. MCCOUBREY, supra note 20, at 219. For Article 25, McCoubrey points
out that in modern war, cities are often defended by anti-aircraft artillery. Id. But, the
Japanese argued in the Shimoda case that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were undefended
before the atomic bombs. Id. She does not discuss if fighter planes are "defense." Id. She
points out most bombardments are part of assaults, and a warning would invite attack on
the warning party. Id. Article 27 shows "[t]he basic principle of limitation of legitimate
bombardment to military objectives ... " Id. Note that the changes from Hague II to
Hague IV offer more protections to non-combatants and protected property. Id.
53. See Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardment By Naval Forces in Time of War,
Oct. 18, 1907, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note, at 811 [hereinafter
Hague IX].
54. Id.
55. See infra Appendix. See also Parks, supra note 22, at 17-19. Parks finds the treaty a
key reflection of customary law. Id. It shows bombing is "related to the military
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requires commanders to "spare as far as possible sacred edifices, buildings
used for artistic, scientific, or charitable purposes, historic monuments,
hospitals, and places where the sick or wounded are collected" as long as
these sites are not used for a military purpose. The inhabitants have the
duty to mark such sites. Article 6 requires a commander to "do his
utmost" to give warning to authorities before a bombardment."
C. The Hague Rules of Air Warfare of 1923
The next advance in the Law of War was a convention written specifi-
cally for aircraft."' After World War I, people began to consider rules for• 59
aircraft,"' which uniquely travel at high speeds and rise in the air. 9
Representatives from France, Italy, Great Britain, Japan, U.S. and
Holland met from December 1922 until February 1923 at The Hague. 6°
The delegations had senior military personnel as advisors." The delegates
created the Hague Rules of Air Warfare, Drafted by a Commission of
Jurists at The Hague. The rules were "never adopted in legally binding
62form" by any nation and include bombing rules in Articles 22-24.
significance of the target" and not whether the area is "defended" or "undefended." Id. It
shows targets are lawful regardless of where they are located. Id. It lists lawful targets that
include military targets, and, "industrial targets of value to the enemy war effort." Id.
Lastly, the treaty relieves "the attacker of the responsibility for "unavoidable" collateral
damage." Id. Parks ends with a comparison to sieges, saying "collateral civilian casualties
during a siege were regarded as a burden upon the besieged commander - an inducement to
end the siege. Id. Bombardment not connected to a siege but resulting in collateral civilian
casualties was not illegal: it was merely a cost of doing the business of war." Id. at 19.
56. See Hague IX, supra note 53, art. 6.
57. See SIPRI, supra note 3, at 23; Dieter Fleck, Strategic Bombing and the Definition of
Military Objectives, 27 ISRAEL YEARBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHIS 41, 43-44 (1997); Judith
Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391, 400 (1993).
58. See JOHN BASSETT MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOME CURRENT ILLUSIONS
182 (1924). "The Washington Conference of 1922 on the Limitation of Armaments adopted
a resolution for the appointment of a Commission of Jurists charged with the preparation
of rules relating to aerial warfare." See 1923 Air Rules, supra note 4; Parks, supra note 22,
at 24.
59. See MOORE, supra note 58, at 190.
60. Id. at 184; 1923 Air Rules, supra note 4.
61. See MOORE, supra note 58, at 182. "Moore, a member of the Permanent Court of
International Justice at The Hague," was head of the twelve-person U.S. delegation; which
included Rear-Admiral Rodgers, of the U.S. Navy and previously President of the Naval
War College, a Brigadier General and seven other military officers. Moore's book lists all
delegates and advisors. Parks, supra note 22, at 25.
62. 1923 Air Rules, supra note 4, art. 22-24. See infra Appendix (for text of Arts. 22-24
and for other target lists).
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Even though they were never adopted, the 1923 Air Rules have much
in common with previous Law of War treaties. The 1923 Air Rules restrict
military objective or necessity, as Articles 22 and 23 ban terrorizing
civilians, damaging private non-military property, injuring non-
combatants, and bombing to collect funds. Article 24(1) has a strict
definition of military necessity, further defined and restricted by Article
24(2)-(4).63
Article 24(2) has a list of proper targets. If there is a military objec-
tive under Article 24(1), then bombing is "[I]egitimate only when directed
exclusively at the following objectives: military forces; military works;
military establishments or depots; factories constituting important and
well-known centers engaged in the manufacture of arms, ammunition or
distinctively military supplies; lines of communications or transportation
used for military purposes."' 4
When considering the location of targets, the 1923 Air Rules do not
distinguish between defended and undefended towns, as did Hague II and
IV.65 The 1923 Air Rules protect populated areas "[n]ot in the immediate
neighborhood of .. ." land forces. If the proper objectives of bombing,
from Article 24(2), are away from land forces, they may not be bombed.
This ban may be considered strict "proportionality." If the appropriate
targets are near the front lines, commanders may only bomb them when
the target is sufficiently important to risk the civilian deaths, in accordance
with Article 24(4). Of course, this allows the commander to make the
proportionality balance. 66 Besides the guidance of Articles 22 through 24,
63. See 1923 Air Rules, supra note 4, arts. 22-24. Note similarities in The Lieber Code,
Hague II and IV, and the 1923 Air Rules. Id. All protect cultural, medical, and historic
places. Art. 25 of the 1923 Air Rules directs a bombing commander to take "all necessary
steps" to "spare as far as possible" places devoted to "public worship, art, science, or
charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospital ships, hospitals and other places where
the sick and wounded are collected." Id. This is similar to Art. 34 of the Lieber Code and
Art. 27 of Hague II and IV. Id. Article 25 of the 1923 Air Rules has instructions for how to
mark protected buildings. Id. Article 26 has procedures for protection of historical
monuments. Id.
64. Id. art. 22-24. See JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
624 (1959). Fleck finds the definition of objective and the target list too restrictive. Fleck,
supra note 57, at 44.
65. See ROGERS, supra note 20, at 51; Gardam, supra note 57, at 400.
66. See Gardam, supra note 57, at 400-01. It is important to distinguish between
indiscriminate attacks and collateral damage. Id. Indiscriminate attacks strike unselectively,
at military and civilian targets or at random. Id. Collateral damage is the unintended
damage resulting from an attack on a valid military target. Id. "There is no way to avert
altogether collateral damage to civilians. Accidents are beyond control by human beings."
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the 1923 Air Rules do not require an attacking commander to take specific
precautions, other than those that can be inferred 7
D. Development of Air Rules Since 1923
Since 1923, there have been many statements on bombing and law,
including some by national leaders. However, law is also shown by
nations' actions. Repeated actions may form customs that can eventually
become established norms in international law." Therefore, this section
will discuss the words of national leaders, state practice, and treaties.
However, a leader's words may often conflict with their actions. This often
makes international law difficult to define.
1. Leaders' Statements
Just before World War II, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain
proposed three bombing principles. He said: it was illegal to bomb or
deliberately attack civilians; targets attacked from the air must be
identified military objectives; and, any military objectives attacked must be
struck with reasonable care so civilians are not hurt.69 The League of
Nations adopted Chamberlain's three points in a non-binding resolution in
September 1938.70
Id. See Yoram Dinstein, The Laws of Air, Missile and Nuclear Warfare, in 27 ISRAEL
YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (1997).
67. See ROGERS, supra note 20, at 51. Inferred precautions may be set by humanity,
chivalry and similar standards or by international law. Id.
68. See The Paqete Habana, 175 U.S. 677; Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876.
69. Chamberlain spoke on June 21, 1938 in the House of Commons. J.M. SPAIGHT, AIR
POWER AND WAR RIGHTS 257 (3d ed. 1947). See ROGERS, supra note 20, at 10, 52-53;
Jochnick & Normand, supra note 3, at 85-86. In 1937, British plans called for strikes on:
German Air Forces and maintenance; German aircraft industry; German military rail,
canal, and road communications when there was a concentration of armies, or to delay an
invasion of Holland, Belgium and France; German war industry, including the Saar, Ruhr
and Rhineland regions. Parks, supra note 22, at 43-44. After Chamberlain's comments, a
British committee headed by Sir Malkin, reported on the Law of War and bombing. Id.
The committee "rejected a total prohibition on bombing and any restriction limiting
bombing to the immediate area of military or naval operations." Id. The committee
recommended against bombing at night, except near land or sea forces, and created specific
guidance and a target list. Id. Sir Malkin's proposals were never used. Id. See infra
Appendix (for Prime Minister Chamberlain's words and the text of Sir Malkin's
Committee's Guidance).
70. The three principles were adopted without dissent. See infra Appendix (for text of
assembly's action). Germany and Japan were not at the vote. SPAIGHT, supra note 69, at
257; Parks, supra note 22, at 36. The 1938 International Law Association's 40th convention
in Amsterdam wrote a Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations Against
New Engines of War, with thirty-two articles. Draft Convention for the Protection of
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On September 1, 1939, President Roosevelt sent a message to Poland,
Italy, Germany, France and England asking them to agree not to bomb
"civilian populations in unfortified cities."" France and England agreed.71
Hitler gave an "unqualified agreement" to limit bombing to military
objectives.73 The agreements to Roosevelt's ideas did not last long once
the war started. Germany bombed Rotterdam and other cities.74 England
and the U.S. bombed German cities. 75 The U.S. destroyed Japanese
cities.
76
Civilian Populations Against New Engines of War, reprinted in THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICTS, supra note 4, at 223. The draft said civilians shall not be targets; undefended
towns shall not be bombed; indiscriminate bombardment is banned; chemical, incendiary,
and bacterial weapons are prohibited; and, safety zones shall be set to protect those under
15, those over 60, and noncombatants. Id. This convention was not accepted by any nation.
Id.
71. See SPAIGHT, supra note 69, at 259; Parks, supra note 22, at 36-37. This was not a
new U.S. government opinion. HOLLAND, supra note 40, at 11. After Japan attacked
Nanking, China, in Sept. 1937, the U.S. sent Japan a response, saying, "[tihis Government
holds the view that any general bombing of an extensive area wherein there resides a large
populace engaged in peaceful pursuits is unwarranted and contrary to the principles of law
and humanity." Id. Japan and the world ignored the U.S. comment. Id.
72. See SPAIGHT, supra note 69, at 259.
73. Id. at 260.
74. Germany bombed Rotterdam in May 1940 and English cities starting in Sept. 1940.
WILLIAMSON MURRAY, WAR IN THE AIR 1914-45 118 (1999); R. ERNEST Dupuy & TREVOR
N. DuPuY, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILITARY HISTORY FROM 3500 B.C. TO THE PRESENT
1065-1066 (2d ed. 1986).
75. On Aug. 28-29, 1940, British bombers attacked Berlin. Karl Klee, The Battle of
Berlin, in DECISIVE BATrLES OF WORLD WAR II 88 (H.A. Jacobsen & J. Rohwer eds.,
Edward Fitzgerald trans., 1965). England bombed other German cities early in the war.
MAX HASTINGS, BOMBER COMMAND 99-113 (1979); SIPRI, supra note 3, at 31. As Allied
air power grew, mass bombings of German city "target areas" started. STONE, supra note
64, at 626. "While each belligerent claimed that it bombed only military objectives, and that
the enemy bombed civilians, it is clear that both became increasingly tolerant of vast
incidental damage to the cities and their populations." Id. at 626-27.
76. In March 1945, U.S. raids on Tokyo killed 90,000. CONRAD C. CRANE, BOMBS,
CITIES AND CIVILIANS: AMERICAN AIR POWER STRATEGY IN WORLD WAR II 120 (1993).
Many reasons are given for why the U.S. bombed cities in World War It, including: it was
part of a "total war" strategy against a strong German enemy; daylight raids in Europe had
huge losses and night bombing of cities was more effective; in Europe and Japan, cities
were destroyed to end the war quickly; in Japan, high altitude raids were inaccurate and
firebombing was more effective; and, the bombing in Japan was to destroy dispersed
industry and force the surrender of a military society that had fought to the end at Iwo Jima
and Okinawa. BUCKLEY, supra note 3, at 125-195. Several "fathers" of modem air power
argued civilians should be bombing targets. Id. British Gen. Hugh Trenchard felt bombing
populated industrial centers would destroy enemy morale and since bombing's
psychological effects were more important than the physical effects, bombing should target
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2. State Practice
In the early part of World War II, British leaders wanted to bomb
only military targets and avoid harming the enemy civilian population.
They knew this limit may not last long in a war, but did not want to be the
first to strike civilians.77 During the war, bombing attacks in daytime
suffered huge losses and Germany and England turned to night raids."'
Attacks often missed their targets due to targeting systems' limitations,
small bomb loads and enemy air defenses. 79 This caused collateral damage
or collateral deaths, a way that warfare affects enemy morale.8
For much of the war, the U.S. used a precision bombing strategy
against military targets and resisted British requests for night raids.81 Early
in 1945, the U.S. made a massive raid on Berlin that hit rail and govern-
ment targets, but killed over 25,000 civilians.82 Later, the U.S. and Britain
razed Dresden. The bombing of this cultural city, full of refugees, has
become controversial; especially since many military targets there were not
struck.83
civilian morale. Id. at 77-78. In the U.S., Lt. Col. Edgar Gorrell argued in 1917 for bombing
Germany's major industrial centers to keep supplies from the front and destroy civilian
morale. Richard J. Overy, Strategic Bombing Before 1939: Doctrine, Planning, and
Operations, in MITCHELL'S LEGACY: CASE STUDIES IN STRATEGIC BOMBARDMENT 21-22
(R. Cargill Hall ed., 1998). U.S. Gen. Billy Mitchell saw World War I end just as German
industrial cities were coming into bomber range. Id. The enemy knew if the war continued,
the cities would be "[l]aid in ruins." id. Mitchell saw the importance of bombing in future
wars and "[eimphasized selection and destruction of the vital centers on which the enemy's
war-making capacity depended." Id. at 39-40. In the 1920's, Italian Gen. Giulio Douhet
found no difference between civilians and combatants in "total war" because entire nations
fought each other. Id. Since World War I showed ground troops could not quickly end a
war, heavy bombers should attack the enemy's population and industry centers to destroy
their morale or will to resist. BUCKLEY, supra note 3, at 74-75. Douhet felt bombing should
continue until "the people themselves, driven by the instinct of self-preservation, would rise
up and demand an end to the war." Overy, supra note 76, at 39-40. Compare Douhet's
words with Gen. Sherman's comment. ROGERS, supra note 39.
77. See Parks, supra note 22, at 44-45.
78. See SIPRI, supra note 3, at 31; HOLLAND, supra note 40, at 15. In the Nov. 14-15,
1940 nighttime raid on Coventry, British fighters shot down no German planes, and only
two German aircraft were lost to anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). Klee, supra note 75, at 90.
79. See SIPRI, supra note 3, at 31.
80. See Parks, supra note 22, at 51.
81. See HOLLAND, supra note 40, at 16-20. U.S. General Eaker was reluctant to move to
night raids and wrote "[w]e must never allow the record of this war to convict us of
throwing the strategic bomber at the man in the street." Id. at 16.
82. Id. at 16-20.
83. See STEPHEN A. GARRETT, ETHICS AND AIRPOWER IN WORLD WAR II: THE BRITISH
BOMBING OF GERMAN CITIES 19-21, 81-85 (1993); ALEXANDER MCKEE, DRESDEN 1945:
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Some of the greatest controversy about Allied bombing was that
attacks on the morale of the civilian population did not work to end the
war. Germany had to be conquered by troops before the war was over.84
Bombing damage was often quickly repaired. Only the Allied strikes
against German oil and ball bearings were really effective in slowing the
German war machine, at least until Germans could reorganize after the
bombing.8' However, it is argued "area" bombing did help win the war. It
forced Germany to devote men, material and arms to defending cities from
air attack, and the bombing affected the leaders, causing them to retaliate
with the costly revenge weapons, V-1 and V-2 rockets." The fire and
nuclear bombing of Japan was also controversial. Supporters are
convinced the bombing ended the war and saved a half-million Allied
lives. Others are sure that the war could have been ended by a Japanese
surrender with fewer civilian deathsi8
THE DEVIL'S TINDERBOX 45-46, 243 (1982); SIPRI, supra note 3, at 34-35. But see
BUCKLEY, supra, note 3, at 163-164.
84. See ROBERT A. PAPE, BOMBING TO WIN: AIR POWER AND COERCION IN WAR 24
(1996). Civilians did not remove Hitler. Germany did not surrender prior to complete
defeat. The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey found that morale (mood and feelings) of the
German people may have been depressed, but this did not affect their behavior. BARRIE
PASKINS & MICHAEL DOCKRILL, THE ETHICS OF WAR 45 (1979).
85. Attacks on German oil and ball bearing sites had mixed results. "Factory buildings
were leveled, but they could and would be rebuilt in a matter of weeks unless they were
bombed repeatedly. The cost to the attacking bomber forces were appalling." Stephen L.
McFarland & Wesley Phillips Newton, The American Strategic Air Offensive Against
Germany in World War II, in MITCHELL'S LEGACY: CASE STUDIES IN STRATEGIC
BOMBARDMENT, supra note 76, at 195-204. For example, a large July 1943 raid on
Hamburg did not significantly affect war output. In September 1943, Hamburg could
"handle 160,000 tons of cargo, only 40,000 tons less than in July." German war production
rose in many ways from 1942 to 1944. GARRETT, supra note 83, at 62, 157. The British
Bombing Survey Unit found "area attacks against German cities could nat have been
responsible for more than a very small part of the fall which actually occurred in German
production by the spring of 1945, and...were also a very costly way of achieving the results
." SIPRI, supra note 3, at 35.
86. See MURRAY, supra note 74, at 100; BUCKLEY, supra note 3, at 165-169.
87. President Truman said in 1959, "I wanted to save a half million boys on our side... I
never lost any sleep over the decision." Barton J. Bernstein, A Post-War Myth: 500,000
U.S. Lives Saved, in HIROSHIMA'S SHADOW 130 (Kai Bird & Lawrence Lifschultz eds.,
1998).
88. Both sides are shown in HIROSHIMA'S SHADOW, supra note 3. It is said the U.S.
demanded an unconditional surrender, then dropped the atomic bombs and accepted a
conditional surrender. It is also argued that the campaign against Japan was necessary
because of the limit of U.S. aircraft. Strategic precision bombing was not effective, but
firebombing was effective. HOLLAND, supra note 40, at 23-28.
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Many reasons are used to support the Allied bombing campaigns in
Europe and Japan. Perhaps the Laws of War did not properly cover the
new weapons and techniques used in World War II or that the law on
distinction only required "ordinary care." 89  Sir Harris felt precision
bombing was not advanced enough and far too costly in men and aircraft;
so night bombing was required to defeat a strong enemy.90 Some focused
on the defender's responsibility to protect civilians by keeping them away
from legitimate military targets. 91 Others find no proper justification for
the bombing that killed so many civilians.
The next illustration of custom and practice and U.S. bombing was the
1950-53 Korean War. U.S. actions in Korea followed the practices set in
World War II. The U.S. "gained air superiority over the North Koreans
and launched punishing interdiction attacks" that "definitely blunted the
89. See Parks, supra note 22, at 51-52. "Distinction" focuses on intent. If the attacker
intends to strike a military objective, then "collateral damage" is excused. But for
firebombing, attackers use explosive and incendiary bombs to destroy large parts of a city,
not just specific military targets. Distinction is complicated by the increased accuracy of
bombs after the development of radio and radar targeting devices. If the British had to hit
Germany somehow and "area bombing" was all they had, then perhaps collateral damage
may be excused. But, by mid-1944, the Allies had command of the air and targeting devices
that improved accuracy. GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE 280 (1980).
90. See ELMER BENDINER, THE FALL OF THE FORTRESSES 68-70 (1980). A frequent
question is "[m]ust the attackers risk their lives to bomb a target as accurately as possible?"
Final Report, supra note 5, at 15. Attackers often want to bomb at night or from high
altitude for their safety, which makes bombing less accurate. Id. This was an issue in World
War II, Kosovo and in other conflicts. Id.
91. See Parks, supra note 22, at 51. Parks says defender, attacker and civilian all must
protect the civilian, and defensive measures, such as fighters or artillery, may cause
bombers to miss, increasing collateral damage. Id.; see also, Hays Parks, The Protection of
Civilians from Air Warfare, 1980 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 65-111. Geoffrey
Best, and others, point out the blurring of the lines between civilians and military in
modern "total war." BEST, supra note 89, at 285.
92. See GARRETr, supra note 83, at 183. Paskins & Dockrill are critical of Allied
bombing for "lacking in coherent thought, as lacking in proportion, and as violating the
rights of noncombatants." PASKINS & DOCKRILL, supra note 84, at 251. Jochnick &
Normand point out, "[t]he Nuremberg Tribunal actually helped legitimate unrestrained
conduct in war by refusing to convict, or even prosecute, based on violations of the laws of
war." Jochnick & Normand, supra note 3, at 94-95. Simon Jenkins says if ground troops
had taken Dresden and killed 25,000 civilians while destroying the city, it would be a war
crime; and bombers should not terrorize from the air. Jenkins, supra note 15. Questions on
the legality or morality of firebombing are not new. In 1944, Father Ford wrote "the air
bombardment of civilian centers is a symbol of total war in its worst sense." John C. Ford,
The Morality of Obliteration Bombing, reprinted in WAR AND MORALITY 40 (Richard
Wasserstrom ed., 1970).
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initial North Korean thrust to the southward. 93  The initial strategic
bombing strategy was to bomb North Korean industry but not cause
massive damage to population centers. The strategy was designed so that
the enemy could not claim "illegal" attacks were made against civilians.94
The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not want to use incendiary weapons against
cities because the U.S. might have to rebuild the damage after the war and
also because it might not reduce enemy morale.95
The initial bombing strategy changed after Chinese troops entered the
war. Then, the Air Force was ordered to destroy communication systems
and towns, cities and villages and was allowed to use incendiary weapons."'
Some air attacks were designed to destroy the morale of civilians who
supported the enemy. This included bombing targets around Pyongyang,
after leaflets had warned residents prior to the attack. 7 Dams were struck
to destroy lines of transportation, but this also threatened the rice crop and
flooded enemy underground bunkers.98
During the Korean War, U.S. planes bombed factories, arsenals,
docks, bridges, warehouses, railcars, locomotives, chemical plants, dams,
and trucks.99 In addition to high explosive bombs, the U.S. used napalm,
incendiary and oil bombs against tanks, troops, armored vehicles, enemy
gun positions, villages and cities.1°°
The U.S. used napalm again in the Vietnam War, but added a new
weapon, defoliants, including "Agent Orange."' Napalm and defoliants
destroyed groundcover and food supplies.1"' Napalm and other incendiar-
ies gave troops "close air support" and destroyed villages, huts, military
buildings, troop positions, radar sites, communications sites, supply
102locations, roads, and factories. Other targets included military targets,
power plants, oil, rail, roads, bridges, and industry. The enemy would get
U.S. forces to strike civilian villages by firing from the villages and quickly
leaving before the air strikes came.' °3
93. Herman S. Wolk, Truman's War, AIR FORCE MAG., Nov. 2000, at 56.
94. See Thomas C. Hone, Strategic Bombardment Constrained: Korea and Vietnam, in
MITCHELL'S LEGACY: CASE STUDIES IN STRATEGIC BOMBARDMENT, supra note 76, at 473.
95. Id. at 473-74.
96. Id. at 478-479.
97. Id. at 488.
98. Id. at 488-490.
99. Id. at 477.
100. See SIPRI, supra note 3, at 43-47.
101. See COMMITTEE ON THE EFFECTS OF HERBICIDES IN VIETNAM, THE EFFECTS OF
HERBICIDES IN SOUTH VIETNAM 11-3 to 11-10 (1974); SIPRI, supra note 3, at 49-58.
102- See SIPRI, supra note 3, at 49-58.
103. See TILFORD, supra note 3, at 71, 75, 81-82, 93, 103.
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Although the U.S. struck a wide variety of targets in the Vietnam
War, air power was not decisive. Bombing was used to cut enemy supply
lines in an aerial interdiction role, but an "all-out bombing campaign"
against North Vietnam was not used because of fear that China might
enter the conflict.'O' Instead of being used to decisively win the war, air
power was often used for political reasons. The ROLLING THUNDER
bombing campaign was used to push for a political settlement. 106 Later, the
LINEBACKER campaign was started to stop an invasion, but LINE-
BACKER II and strikes against Hanoi were used to aid the Saigon
government and as tools for diplomatic purposes.'0 7 While the bombing
had a military purpose, it was also designed to force North Vietnam to the
-- 108
peace talks.
While the air campaigns in the Vietnam War often had political goals,
air power played a more decisive role in later conflicts. The next major
U.S. conflict that illustrates custom and practice was the 1991 Gulf War. °9
The strategy for the air campaign reflected the ideas of U.S. Air Force
Colonel John Warden. n ° His focus for air campaigns is destroying "centers
of gravity," the "characteristics, capabilities, or locations from which the
enemy derives his freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight." '
Warden's ideas are represented by a model of five concentric circles, much
like a "bull's-eye." The most important "ring" is the innermost, the
National Leadership and its communications. The rest of the rings,
moving out from the center are: Key Production, including energy,
104. The U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam said bombing, "though extremely important,
has neither interdicted infiltration nor broken the will of the North Vietnamese, and it is
doubtful that it can accomplish either." Id. at 89, 109-140, 283. The war had a difficult slow
target selection process with nine levels of approval. Id. During the war "smart" bombs
were used. These have laser or electro-optical guidance systems and are much more
accurate than other bombs. "President Johnson's personal control of the bombing resulted
in severe restrictions that frustrated and hampered his military leaders." HOLLAND, supra
note 40, at 34-35.
105. See Hone, supra note 94, at 495-496.
106. Id. at 500.
107. See Tilford, supra note 3, at 228; Hone, supra note 94, at 513-514.
108. See Tilford, supra note 3, at 234; Parks, supra note 3, at 27.
109. Also called "The Second Persian Gulf War" and "Operation Desert Storm."
EDWARD C. MANN, III, THUNDER AND LIGHTNING: DESERT STORM AND THE AIRPOWER
DEBATES 2-4, 193 (1995).
110. See Richard G. Davis, Strategic Bombing in the Gulf War, in MITCHELL's LEGACY:
CASE STUDIES IN STRATEGIC BOMBARDMENT, supra note 76, at 535, 540. Col. John A.
Warden III's strategy is outlined in his book, JOHN A. WARDEN, THE AIR CAMPAIGN:
PLANNING FOR COMBAT (1988).
111. Davis, supra note 110, at 535; WARDEN, supra note 110, at 7-8.
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research, and "bottleneck industries;" National Infrastructure, including
transportation; National Population; and, the outermost ring, the Fielded
Military Forces.
Using Warden's five-ring model, target sets were selected. When
attacking Leadership, the air campaign attacked Iraq's leadership to
paralyze it and to destroy communications required for command and
control."' War plans included striking at military and civilian power plants
and telecommunications sites to eliminate Hussein's ability to control his
troops and wage war. 14 When striking Key Production, the campaign
bombed targets relating to electricity, oil distribution and storage, and,
weapons research and development and production including Scud missile
launchers."'
The U.S. officers who planned the air war and picked targets were
trained in the Law of War. They considered military necessity, humanity
and limiting civilian casualties in their planning. " ' The U.S. used
precision-guided munitions to limit civilian deaths.' 7  During the war,
112 See MANN, supra note 109, at 36; Davis, supra note 110, at 535.
113. See Davis, supra note 110, at 535-541.
114. See COL. RICHARD T. REYNOLDS, HEART OF THE STORM: THE GENESIS OF THE AIR
CAMPAIGN AGAINST IRAQ 54 (1995).
115. See Davis, supra note 110, at 541; LT. COL. WILLIAM F. ANDREWS, AIRPOWER
AGAINST AN ARMY 28-31 (1998). Other target sets in the war included:
Leadership; Command, Control, and Communications; Strategic Air De-
fenses; Airfields; Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Research and Produc-
tion; Naval Forces and Port Facilities; Military Storage and Production;
Railroads and Bridges, Electrical Power; and Oil Refining and Distribu-
tion Facilities. [U.S. Gen.] Schwartzkopf added the Republican Guard as
a category and Scuds soon emerged as a separate target set. After the
beginning of Desert Storm, two more categories appeared: fixed surface-
to-air missile sites in the KTO [Kuwaiti Theater of Operations] and
breaching sites for the ground offensive.
W. Murray, Air War in the Persian Gulf, quoted in Final Report to the Prosecutor by the
Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato0613OO.htm (last
visited Feb. 9, 2001).
116. See DeSaussure, supra note 23, at 58-59; Humphries, supra note 3, at 26. Key
targeting limits were "the need to minimize Iraqi civilian casualties" and protect "cultural
and religious sites." Some attacks were changed to limit the effect of misses on civilians,
even if aircrews faced greater danger or it reduced a weapon's effectiveness. Only Cruise
missiles and precision munitions were used in downtown Baghdad, with strikes at night.
Areas near cultural or religious sites were not targeted, even if Iraqis put military material
or functions in these areas. JAMES A. WINNEFELD ET AL., A LEAGUE OF AIRMEN U.S. AIR
POWER IN THE GULF WAR 178 (1994).
117. See DeSaussure, supra note 23, at 60-61.
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Judge Advocates advised commanders on how to accomplish their
missions legally, including giving specific guidance on tactics and targeting
decisions."'
In Operation Deliberate Force (ODF), the U.S., U.N. and NATO
used the Law of War to build Rules of Engagement for the 1995 air
campaign in Bosnia.9 The campaign was created to promote peace. 20The planners considered "centers of gravity" in their target selection.'
118. See Humphries, supra note 3, at 26; Keeva, supra note 22, at 52; Myrow, supra note
33, at 135. Specific examples of JAGs giving advice include advising not to strike parked
Iraqi fighters near the Temple of Ur, and telling commanders that they could take a more
"liberal approach" when striking particular targets. Keeva, supra note 22, at 57-58; Myrow,
supra note 33, at 141. Major Heintzelman collected information about a specific location
and shared it with commanders on the targeting committee. Keeva, supra note 22, at 58.
He also knew that some laser guided weapons "usually fell short or long, but rarely landed
right or left of their target." Myrow, supra note 33, at 140. This let him recommend
directions of attack to minimize collateral damage. Id.
119. ODF started in Bosnia on Aug. 30, 1995, after a brutal mortar attack on Sarajevo.
NATO's response was air attacks on Bosnian Serb military targets until Sept. 20, 1995. The
U.S. flew two-thirds of the missions. Larry K. Wentz, Bosnia - Setting the Stage, in LESSONS
FROM BOSNIA 23 (Larry Wentz ed., 1997). It was key to limit any collateral civilian deaths.
Rules of Engagement (ROE) had to be "restrictive enough to satisfy the political and
operational sensitivities of both NATO and UN political and military authorities." Lt. Col.
Ronald M. Reed, Chariots of Fire: Rules of Engagement in Operation Deliberate Force, in
DELIBERATE FORCE: A CASE STUDY IN EFFECTIVE AIR CAMPAIGNING 381 (Col. Robert C.
Owen ed., 2000). The final ROE "walked this tightrope of competing influences." "The
planners who wrote the ROE-vigorously supervised by UN, NATO and individual national
authorities-attempted to include the maximum amount of military flexibility within the
politically charged planning environment. Since the NAC [North Atlantic Council, the
ruling body of NATO] approved all ROE, any one of the 16 sovereign NATO member
nations had veto power over the rules." Id. at 397. Initial ROE required high-level
approval from both U.N. and NATO leaders for any use of force, a "dual-key" approach.
This delayed any response, and led to the July 1995 loss of Srebrenica and Zepa. "Because
of the negative experience with the dual-key process and the perceived inability of the UN
political structure to make timely decisions, NAC stressed the importance of the UN's
transferring execution authority for air actions to its military commanders." Id. at 407. This
helped military response time, but problems remained in coordinating the different NATO,
U.N. and U.S. ROE. "The restrictions placed on targeting remind one of those used in
Vietnam. Unlike the political restrictions placed on military operations in Vietnam,
however, in Deliberate Force the military's own restraint limited operations." The military
"may now be tying its own hands." Id. at 416-417. ODF primarily used smart bombs, and
"nearly 70 percent of all munitions used and more than 98 percent of munitions dropped by
the United States were precision weapons." Id. at 419.
120. See COL. ROBERT C. OWEN, Preface to DELIBERATE FORCE: A CASE STUDY IN
EFFECTIVE AIR CAMPAIGNING, supra note 119, at xvii.
121. See Col. Maris McCrabb, US and NATO Doctrine for Campaign Planning, in
DELIBERATE FORCE: A CASE STUDY IN EFFECTIVE AIR CAMPAIGNING, supra note 119, at
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Targets and plans were coordinated with U.N. leadership, NATO
leadership, and unit commanders. The planning process for the initial air
strikes took four to five months. Initial targets included air defense
systems, communications nodes and ammunition storage facilities; but
later targets included fielded forces, bridges and "choke points."'2
Planning and control of the air operations focused on keeping Serb
military and civilian casualties to a minimum, so NATO would not appear
to be taking sides. 24
Political concerns complicated the 1999 operations in Kosovo' 25 forc-
ing commanders to keep collateral damage to a minimum, while complicat-
126
ing the targeting process with coordination through 19 NATO nations.
65-81; Col. Christopher M. Campbell, The Deliberate Force Air Campaign Plan, in
DELIBERATE FORCE: A CASE STUDY IN EFFECTIVE AIR CAMPAIGNING, supra note 119, at
101.
122. The air strikes had to be approved by both NATO and U.N. leadership in a "dual-
key" process.
Some people have called into question the concept of the dual-key com-
mand-authorization system uneasily developed between the UN and
NATO. Undoubtedly, this process violated the principle of unity of
command, especially in cases of tactical-level close air support operations
that demand a suitable structure to relay near-real-time information and
command decisions. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke flatly stated that
"the dual key system was an unmitigated disaster. It did great damage to
both the UN and NATO." Because of the differences between the two
organizations and their mandates, he believed that NATO and the UN
never should have been related in this fashion. Ultimately, though, a
modified version of this process could have-perhaps should have-been
devised ... In hindsight, critics can declare that the arrangements could
have worked much better, and to some extent that viewpoint has validity.
Lt. Col. Bradley S. Davis, The Planning Background, in DELIBERATE FORCE: A CASE
STUDY IN EFFECIVE AIR CAMPAIGNING, supra note 119, at 59-60. Officers hesitate to
criticize superiors in writing. Holbrooke's quote may show Davis' real opinion.
123. Id. at 37-60; Campbell, supra note 121, at 114-15.
124. See Lt. Col. Mark J. Conversino, Executing Deliberate Force, 30 August - 14
September 1995, in DELIBERATE FORCE: A CASE STUDY IN EFFECTIVE AIR CAMPAIGNING,
supra note 119, at 159.
125. The NATO air campaign, Operation Allied Force, against Yugoslavia lasted from
Mar. 24 until June 10, 1999. Many questioned its legality under U.S. or International Law.
Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Walter Gary Sharp, Jr., Operation Allied
Force: Reviewing the Lawfilness of NATO's Use of Military Force to Defend Kosovo, 23
MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 295 (1999); Louis Henkin et al., Editorial Comments: NATO's
Kosovo Intervention, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 824 (1999).
126. See Maj. Nancy Richards & MSgt. Jack L. Craft, JA's Role in Assessing Collateral
Damage, JAG WARRIOR, Vol. III, Issue 1, at 3 (2000). Majors Dales and Eflein
experienced the difficulty of working with 19 nations and wrote:
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Specific targets included: Serb artillery, field headquarters, government
ministries, refineries, military vehicles and formations, air defenses,
military and police headquarters, and supply routes.'27 In spite of efforts to
limit collateral damage, about 500 civilians were killed and 820 wounded.1
21
Incidents causing criticism included bombing the Chinese Embassy and a
Belgrade radio and television station, attacks that released chemical
pollution from factories, an attack on a civilian convoy, and bombs
dropped on a railroad bridge that struck a passenger train.129 In what may
The method by which targets were selected, reviewed and approved had
more of a political flavor than is normal in an operation, because not one,
but 19 "NATO White Houses," had to agree on individual targets. Need-
less to say, getting 19 nations to agree on something doesn't happen
quickly. After the initial group of 40-odd targets, we received targets in
ones, twos or dozens as the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved
them. Because we never knew when to expect the targets, it was impossi-
ble to plan ahead to schedule TWG [target working group] meetings ....
A fascinating aspect of OAF [Operation Allied Force] was the multi-
national political effect on targeting. When 19 nations must agree on
something, there are bound to be political concessions made. The North
Atlantic Council (NAC) dealt with most of the negotiating and conces-
sions, but some of the concerns filtered down and had to be addressed at
the CAOC [Combined Air Operations Center, in Vicenza, Italy]. Differ-
ent nations had reservations about bombing particular targets, and these
reservations had to be considered .... One allied lawyer raised the issue
of different national standards of determining "acceptable" collateral
damage and how these views were considered in the legal review of tar-
gets. An effort was always made to satisfy allied concerns. Additionally,
the CAOC had Senior National Representatives of the allied nations who
could express their concerns, and each NATO nation was represented in
the NAC.
Major David Dales & Major Dawn Eflien, What Do Lawyers Do When the Bombs Start
Dropping?, THE JAG WARRIOR, Volume III, Issue 1, at 5-6 (2000).
127. See Final Report, supra note 5, at 5, 12-13. The report also points out that the U.S.
and France have not adopted Protocol I. Id.
128. Id. at 14.
129. Id. at 15-23; Al Report, supra note 3, at 21-55; Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
website, supra note 6. Although NATO said the bombing of the Chinese Embassy was a
mistake, Amnesty International felt the error showed "NATO was not taking sufficient
safeguards in selecting and vetting targets for attack." Amnesty International also pointed
out that after the accident, bombing was not halted to correct the errors that caused the
accident. Defense Secretary Cohen pointed out that NATO flew about 18,000 missions and
only about a dozen had unintended casualties. Al Report, supra note 3, at 37, § 5.6. Over
eighty "civilian industrial facilities" were bombed, "causing serious if not irreparable
environmental damage." Bostian, supra note 8, at 230; Schwabach, supra note 8, at 117.
Note that the ICRC target list provided in Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8
June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, at 632-633 (see Appendix), allows
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be considered a "media trial," NATO officials were indicted and tried in
Belgrade for war crimes."'
3. Treaties and Conventions
Lessons from World War II were codified in the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions,"' protecting: the wounded and sick in armed forces in the
field; the wounded, sick and shipwrecked in the armed forces at sea;• ." 132
prisoners of war; and, civilians. The conventions say that hospitals and
medical units, facilities, transports and aircraft are not to be attacked.33
However, the conventions do not specifically address bombardment,
except to say prisoner of war camps and internment camps should have
shelters from bombardment.'34
After the Geneva Conventions, the next important conventions to
show international law were the conventions to write and sign Protocols I
and II during the 1970's.' Protocol I protects victims of international
armed conflicts. Protocol II protects victims of non-international armed
conflicts. 36 Protocol I is an effort to update or modernize the Law of
the targeting of broadcasting and television stations. The destruction of the station was
"aimed at disrupting and degrading the C3 (Command, Control and Communications)
network. In the same night, radio buildings and towers, and electrical power transformer
stations were bombed. NATO reported hitting these targets because the civilian and
military communications networks used the same facilities. The bombing was also justified
because the station was used for propaganda. This basis for the bombing proved
controversial. Final Report, supra note 5, at 18-19.
130. Just before their Presidential election, Yugoslavia tried fourteen NATO leaders for
war crimes, but none of the leaders attended the September 18, 2000 Belgrade trial.
Yugoslavia Puts NA TO Leaders on Trial, CNN, Sept. 19, 2000, available at www.cnn.com;
Hearing at Trial of NATO Leaders Starts, SERBIA INFO NEWS, Sept. 18, 2000, available at
http://www.serbia-info.com.
131. See Geneva I, supra note 27; Geneva II, supra note 27; Geneva III, supra note 27;
Geneva IV, supra note 27.
132. Id.
133. Id.; See Geneva I, supra note 27, arts. 19, 20, 35, 36, Geneva II, supra note 27, arts.
22-25, 27, 38, 39, supra note 27, Geneva IV, arts. 14, 18, 21, 22, annex.
134. Geneva III, supra note 27, art. 23; Geneva IV, supra note 27, art. 88.
135. Protocol I, supra note 27; Protocol II, supra note 27.
136. See Protocol II, supra note 27. Protocol I was ratified by 140 nations, Protocol II by
131 nations. The U.S. signed Protocol I but ratified neither. Schwabach, supra note 8, at
126; DeSaussure, supra note 23, at 49-50; OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at
52 n.8. For the U.S. Government perspective on the protocols, see Michael L. Matheson,
Session One: The United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to
the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
415, 419 (1987). For an analysis of the Protocols, see Parks, supra note 22, at 63-225.
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War. 3 7  Parts apply to air warfare.'38  Some key provisions include:
protection of the natural environment;139 banning reprisals against civilians,
cultural objects and places of worship; banning indiscriminate attacks; and,
banning attacks against dams, dikes and nuclear power plants, if the
attacks would cause "severe losses among the civilian population."' 4 In its
commentary to the protocols, the Red Cross also offered a model list of
legitimate military objectives.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Problems with the Status Quo
1. Public Criticism
The Belgrade "media trial" was an attempt to use the media to gain
public support. Criticism of NATO's role in the Balkans may make it hard
for future coalitions to be effective.142 Media and public criticism can harm
137. See Fenrick, supra note 42, at 550; Infeld, supra note 42, at 118.
138. See Protocol I, supra note 27, art. 49(3).
139. Id. arts. 35(3), 55; ROGERS, supra note 20, at 108. The environment is also protected
by the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environ-
mental Modification Techniques, Dec. 10, 1976, 31 Stat. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151.
140. Protocol I, supra note 27, arts. 51(5), 51(6), 53(c), 56, 85(3)(b), 85(3)(c); McCou-
BREY, supra note 20, at 178, 218, 308.
141. See Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, reprinted in W. Hayes Parks, Air War and the Law of War,
32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 7 (1990). See Appendix for a copy of the target list. In the late 1980's
and early 1990's, the next convention on the Law of War produced a manual for conflicts at
sea. It did not cover rules for air war or bombing, but reaffirmed Law of War rules such as:
distinction; military necessity; humanity; proportionality; banning indiscriminate attacks;
and, avoiding civilian casualties and collateral damage. SAN REMO MANUAL ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA (Louise Doswald-Beck
ed., 1995), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/73cb71d18dc4372741256739003e6372/
5b310cc97f166be3c12563f6005e3e09?OpenDocument (last visited Nov. 13, 2002). The
Manual resulted from a series of meetings starting in 1987 and it is intended to clarify the
current law. Id.
142. The U.S. seldom fights without allies. The U.S., Great Britain, France and Russia
allied in World Wars I and II. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 507 (125th ed.
1993) [hereinafter WORLD ALMANAC]. In the Korean War, 20 nations aided the U.S., 13
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 467 (1973) [hereinafter ENCY. BRIT.]. Six nations joined U.S.
troops in Grenada in Oct. 1983. WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 142, at 527. In 1991, thirty-
five nations joined the U.S. in the Gulf War. WINNEFELD, supra note 116, at 145; Roger
Normand & Chris af Jochnick, The Legitimization of Violence: A Critical Analysis of the
Gulf War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 387 (1994). The Dec. 1995 U.S. led Bosnia peacekeeping
force had 60,000 troops from thrity-six nations. Wentz, supra note 119, at 3. In Kosovo, the
U.S. acted with NATO. Peter Grier, Airpower Called Decisive in Kosovo, AIR FORCE
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a coalition's effectiveness because the perception of an illegal war or war
crimes hurts public support. 143 NATO nations, as democracies, need to be
conscious of public support. The U.S. must also maintain its historically
good reputation. If this reputation suffers, it may limit the formation and
actions of future coalitions.
Public criticism can affect public opinion and support for NATO or
U.S. military operations. This is a political problem that may limit the
military options available. Additionally, as the International Criminal
Court develops, public criticism may compel nations to raise specific cases
against NATO or the U.S. before the Court. So, public criticism may
affect public opinion and force legal problems later; especially as the
public expects "perfect" wars. 44
Public perceptions are important in modern war. During Kosovo
operations, Milosevic used the media to battle NATO in the airwaves. He
let the BBC and CNN broadcast in his efforts to affect western public
opinion.' Some felt that his use of the airwaves made his TV and radio
stations legitimate NATO targets.146
An Amnesty International (AI) report listed problems with the Kos-
ovo campaign. AI found friction within NATO whether or not the
Belgrade radio and TV station was a legal target, saying the British and
French refused to bomb it.47 Al called the attack a war crime.'48 AI was
critical of a bridge blown up during the day instead of at night when there
MAG., Sept. 2000, at 16; Ruth Wedgwood, NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J.
INT'L L. 828 (1999); Dales & Eflien, supra note 126, at 5.
143. See McCOUBREY, supra note 20, at 71-73; Keeva, supra note 22, at 55; Parks, supra
note 22, at 81. Former North Vietnamese commander Bui Tin commented on the Vietnam
War, saying, "[tlhe conscience of America was part of its war-making capability, and we
were turning that power in our favor. America lost because of its democracy; through
dissent and protest it lost the ability to mobilize a will to win." Col. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.,
How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007: A Warning From the Future, WKLY. STANDARD,
Jan. 29, 1996, at 24 [hereinafter Dunlap-2007]. Dunlap's article is an interesting fictional
account of a leader in 2007 explaining how they won a war against the U.S. id.
144. Michael Ignatieff points out that since the Gulf War, precision strikes are now
expected and the "[w]estern public has come to think of war as laser surgery ... We
routinely demand perfection from the technology that surrounds us - from our cell phones,
computers and cars. Why not from war?" Michael Ignatieff, The Virtual Commander: How
NA TO Invented a New Kind of War, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 2, 1999, at 30.
145. See Michael Ignatieff, Balkan Physics, THE NEW YORKER, May 10, 1999, at 75.
146. Id. at 75-78. Ignatieff also points out the moral conflicts of "high-tech war." Id.
Should modern military missions protect innocent civilians or military fighter pilots?
147. See AI Report, supra note 3, at 10, 12, 33. Al reported NATO nations could each
decide what part of the NATO ROE to adopt, and had different treaty obligations and
different standards of humanitarian law. Id.
148. Id. at 31.
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would be less traffic, 149 attacks that hit hospitals,15 ° the Chinese Embassy
attack,'15' and other incidents. The attack on the embassy resulted from
poor intelligence. But, NATO also bombed a Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA) barracks; based on old information it was a Serbian Army barracks.
This accident was after both the KLA and the Organization of Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) reported to NATO for about a month
that it was in KLA hands.'
The perception of war crimes may result from a lack of public under-
standing of the Laws of War and increased media attention and intense
criticism of "questionable" missions such as the bombing of the Belgrade
radio and TV station. The media is more important because modern
coverage means disagreements between coalition leaders can be
magnified, and air strikes and collateral damage can be broadcast live
worldwide. 53 This has increasingly meant any level of collateral damage is
too high.'14 The public is less willing to accept military or civilian deaths in
149. Id. at 34-35, 41-42.
150. Id. at 35-37, 42-44.
151. Id. at 14, 37-38. Al was also critical of NATO's use of cluster bombs and depleted
uranium rounds. Id.
152. Id. at 15-16, 53-55.
153. See WINNEFELD, supra note 116, at 275.
154. See Ignatieff, supra note 144, at 30.
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military operations."' With improved technology and the increased use of
"smarter" weapons, the public standard may soon be perfection.116
In the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein showed the world how to use the
vast destruction caused by U.S. air strikes against the U.S. Future enemy
leaders, willing to sacrifice their military, people and infrastructure, may
follow his example, especially since Milosevic has also shown it to be
effective. Others may follow the example of the Viet Cong in Vietnam
and get U.S. air strikes to destroy civilian areas. Current U.S. targeting
155. Civilian deaths are used by the enemy and shown in the world media. The U.S. is
reluctant to have any military deaths. Dunlap points out "[t]he deaths of 18 American
soldiers in Somalia-followed by the telecast of a U.S. soldier's body dragged through
Mogadishu's streets-caused a public outcry that forced a humiliated America to forsake its
policy objectives." Dunlap-2007, supra note 143, at 24. The possibility of casualties in
Bosnia delayed a response in the 1990s, "despite the occurrence of outright genocide." Id.
In Kosovo operations, the U.S. was upset when the U.K. said NATO had to consider
ground troops. Eventually, NATO won without ground troops in combat. Allan Little,
Behind the Kosovo Crisis, BBC, Mar. 12, 2000, at 4-7, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk (last
visited Feb. 9, 2001) [hereinafter BBC]. Even training deaths by natural causes cause
controversy for the U.S. military, such as Air Force trainee Micah Schindler's death. Sig
Christenson, Lackland Reviewing Training: Changes are made in Wake of Death, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept. 14, 1999, at 1A (follow-up news on Sept. 15 (1B), Sept. 26
(6G), Sept. 29 (1A); Oct. 10 (6J), Oct. 13 (6B), Oct. 15 (1A); Nov. 17 (1A), Nov. 27 (1B)).
A survey by Feaver and Gelpi finds U.S. government officials have more "casualty
aversion" than the general public. They suggest officials felt the "CNN effect" in Somalia
and pulled out while "Americans would have tolerated an expanded effort to catch and
punish him [Mohamed Farah Aideed]." Peter D. Feaver & Christopher Gelpi, A Look
At... Casualty Aversion: How Many Deaths Are Acceptable? A Surprising Answer, WASH.
POST, Nov. 9,1999, at B3.
156. Wars since Vietnam have used more "smart" weapons. This may form a legal
"custom" requiring them. But see Infeld, supra note 42. NATO must not suggest the
weapons are costly, and may bill the enemy for the weapons. In future wars, NATO should
seize enemy assets to pay for war costs. After Iran seized the U.S. embassy in 1979, $14
billion in Iranian government assets in the U.S. were frozen. Later, laws let victims of
Iran's "sponsored terrorism" sue in U.S. courts for the funds, with initial payments made by
the U.S. government. See U.S. Government to Pay American Victims of Terrorism, CNN,
Oct. 22, 2000, at www.cnn.com/2000/US/10/22/terrorism.damages.ap (last visited Nov.
2000); Iranian Files Suit to Free Assets Frozen in U.S., CNN, Nov. 14, 2000, at
www.cnn.com!2000/WORLD/meast/11/14/iran.usa.reut/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2000). If
NATO plans to bomb an enemy military target, we can use "dumb bombs" risking lives and
property; or, the enemy can use cash or even frozen assets to buy smart weapons for less
collateral damage. It may be best to buy accuracy, but the enemy can save money by
moving civilians from the target area and accepting the greater collateral damage caused by
"dumb" bombs. The enemy is responsible for civilians and the location of their military
targets. The enemy may offer to destroy the target themselves, at a fraction of NATO's
cost. Precision munitions can be expensive. Bombs cost from $50,000 to $100,000 each,
with cruise missiles running around $1.35 million. See Infeld, supra note 42, at 131.
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philosophy accepts collateral damage deaths if the military attempts to
strike a lawful military target.
Hussein, Milosevic, and others have and will continue to use collateral
damage deaths against the U.S. in the war of public opinion. Nations
portray themselves as "innocent" victims of U.S. power.' Leaders may
even welcome or create collateral damage deaths as a tool for public
relations 9
It is not just enemies who condemn the U.S.' 6w During and after the
Gulf War, it was the media, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International,
and civilians, including former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark. It is
not just criticism of one conflict. When many accuse the U.S. of mistakes
and war crimes in different operations, it affects public opinion and should
cause us to review our strategies. The Gulf War and the Kosovo
operations may become linked in people's memories as "the two most
recent examples of abuse of U.S. military power." This is especially true as
the years pass and the veterans die as such righteous wars as World War I
and II fade into the background of long ago history.
157. For examples of how Iraq and Yugoslavia use collateral damage, see the Permanent
Mission of Iraq to the United Nations, at www.iraqi-mission.org/iraqbackup.htm (last
visited Feb. 12, 2001); Federal Republic of Yugoslavia site at www.gov.yu, (last visited Feb.
12, 2001).
158. Iraqi uses many of the collateral effects of the Gulf War in an effort to end economic
sanctions. A search at www.yahoo.com found eight groups working against sanctions. But,
they do not focus on the Iraq's development and use of weapons of mass destruction, Iraq's
repression of Kurds and others, or Iraq's holding over 600 Kuwaiti prisoners of war. The
Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations, supra note 157; Kuwait Information
Office, at www.Kuwait-info.org (last visited Feb. 12, 2001); IRAQ UNDER SIEGE: THE
DEADLY IMPACT OF SANCTIONS AND WAR (Anthony Arnove ed., 2000); Tom Heinen,
Saddam's Legacy, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 6-8, 2000.
159. During Kosovo operations, people in Belgrade massed on bridges "carrying candles
and wearing target signs" to discourage and protest NATO strikes. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF,
VIRTUAL WAR: KosOVO AND BEYOND 138 (2000). It has also been suggested that a future
enemy might detonate a nuclear bomb in their own territory and blame the U.S., in order to
gain public opinion support. Dunlap-2007, supra note 143, at 26.
160. When an enemy accuses NATO or the U.S. of war crimes, the author recommends
an active response. Ask the enemy or the world community to outline an appropriate
response to the evil NATO or the U.S. faces. NATO and the U.S. could also ask the ICRC
to help negotiate proper bombing targets. In some ways, the ICRC would have to support
NATO's actions, rather than allow the evil to continue. Kosovo is a great example. While
Milosevic could try and explain or excuse his ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, there is no
appropriate reason to support his actions. The ICRC would be forced to support the
humanitarian effort to stop the genocide.
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While the Gulf War seemed righteous, it generated a lot of criticism;S 161
even with attorneys advising commanders. One criticism was that more
"smart" weapons were not used.62 Critics found fault with daytime
bombing of bridges that killed civilians, and with air strikes on military
hospitals, food plants, agricultural storage centers, an air raid shelter,
water treatment facilities and electrical power plants."3
If the U.S. considers the public criticism and the importance of public
opinion, the U.S. is caught in several dilemmas. Should the U.S. cause
devastating destruction to win a war quickly with a minimum of U.S.
deaths? This could be an attempt to win while public opinion supports the
military action. But, this risks accusations of war crimes and negative
public opinion over our tactics and vast destruction. Should the U.S. react
in a slower fashion, acting more carefully? This risks allowing a problem,
such as ethnic cleansing, to continue. Meanwhile, public opinion may
move away from military support.
After a war is over, the U.S. can either aid the people we fought, or
leave behind devastation to be used against us in a worldwide media
campaign. Or, should the U.S. do nothing in the face of genocide and evil?
This leads to criticism for failure to act, or for failure to act sooner, as in
the genocides, mass killings and crimes against humanity in Nazi Germany,
Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, Cambodia and other places. However, adoption
of a target list by NATO nations could diffuse criticism of NATO targets
in future conflicts and allow a sufficiently rapid response.
161. See DeSaussure, supra note 23, at 58-59.
162. Id. at 60-61; Infeld, supra note 42, at 109; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 5-
6.
163. See CLARK, supra note 2, at 42, 59-84; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 4-11.
Normand & Jochnick have unique criticisms of the war they see as one of the "most
unbalanced applications of military force in history." The Coalition's power means it "must
be held to a higher standard of conduct" in protecting civilians. Coalition leaders caused
incredible amounts of destruction in Iraq. They bombed sixteen of eighteen main power
stations, striking one thirteen times, the last time "minutes before the cease-fire," reducing
"Iraq's electrical output to less than four percent of the pre-war capacity, creating
conditions for a public health catastrophe." The attacks were not necessary since Iraq's
military had generators; and, the Coalition did not bomb plants in Kuwait, which supplied
the Iraqi military there, until just before the ground war. There is a question about if the
Coalition ever bombed Kuwaiti power plants, which were only damaged enough to reduce
output by 5-7% of pre-war capacity. The Coalition destroyed Iraq's oil industry, going well
beyond what was needed in the war. After destroying central TV and microwave facilities,
the Coalition repeatedly struck useless local facilities. The Coalition destroyed civilian
product factories, bombing until the cease-fire. Normand & Jochnick see a "consistent
historical pattern," that the Laws of War are "deliberately structured to disregard
humanitarian considerations." Normand & Jochnick, supra note 142, at 400.
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2. Dissention within Coalitions
Outside criticism of U.S. led coalitions is highlighted and worsened by
dissention within the coalitions. Coalition nations make difficult decisions
during military operations. The targets in the Gulf War and Kosovo
highlight one of the most difficult questions in bombing. Should targets be
bombed when they have both military and civilian uses? These targets are
often called "dual use" or "mixed use" targets.1 64 The U.S. position is that
a target that has a military use is a proper subject of attack, so power
plants are bombed to deprive the enemy military of power for radar
stations, radios, communications, and manufacturing. However, the
destruction of a power plant may also affect civilian hospitals, food
supplies, and water treatment.166 If there is doubt about a target, such as a
school, church or home, it is "presumed to have no military purpose." '67
All U.S. allies do not share U.S. views on dual use targets.6 8 For
example, after the Kosovo bombing operations, French President Chirac
164. See Major C. B. Shotwell, Economy and Humanity in the Use of Force: A Look at the
Aerial Rules of Engagement in the 1991 Gulf War, 4 USAFA J. LEG. STUD. 24 (1993);
Davis, supra note 110, at 602.
165. See Shotwell, supra note 164, at 24.
166. Collateral damage (harm to civilians or their property) analysis focuses on the
damage at the time of the bombing, a short-term view. Gulf War critics showed short and
long-term effects of collateral damage, perhaps worsened by U.N. sanctions and Saddam
Hussein's decisions. Human Rights Watch pointed out:
The nation's electricity dependent water purification and sewage treat-
ment facilities were crippled, creating a serious health hazard. Hospitals
and clinics were forced to meet this growing health emergency, and to
treat the war wounded, with, at most, erratic electricity supplied by back-
up generators. Vaccines and medicines requiring refrigeration deterio-
rated and were difficult to replace. A UNICEF representative in Iraq
noted in late May the "vicious circle" of "poor hygiene, contaminated wa-
ter and poor diet," which he said left about 100,000 Iraqi children under
one year of age vulnerable to diarrhea and dehydration.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 9-10.
167. Shotwell, supra note 164, at 24.
168. During the Spring of 2001, at the Judge Advocate General's School of the U.S. Army
in Charlottesville, Virginia, the author interviewed foreign Judge Advocate General
officers. Each of these officers was from a nation closely allied to the U.S. The author
heard U.S. allies had different views about bombing dual use targets. A JAG pointed out
few nations want to issue doctrine to limit targeting options in future conflicts.
A Canadian JAG pointed out that they take a practical approach and would strike
the Belgrade TV station, but would not bomb a water purification plant or air raid shelter
that served both military and civilians. Canadians focus on getting the best and most
current intelligence information. In their Army, they must see the target before destroying
it; and in a similar fashion, the Air Force demands the best intelligence information
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told a reporter that Chirac protected bridges in Belgrade."' U.S. Army
General Wesley Clark, military commander of the allied campaign, spent
the conflict coordinating target approvals between NATO nations.
Eventually he gained more control, but maintained a target team for
NATO aircraft, and one for U.S. aircraft."7 This let him use U.S. aircraft
for missions that other NATO nations refused.
While General Clark was coordinating target approvals, one of his
key officers had a different targeting concern. U.S. Air Force General
Michael Short, head of the air campaign, felt NATO was mistakenly
focusing on tactical targets instead of striking strategic targets. He said
"There were a couple of times when I felt I just can't do this any more.
We're just not doing this right and I owe it to my people to stand up and
say we're just not doing this right." He asked for permission to bomb
strategic fixed targets in Serbia instead of hunting for mobile small targets
in Kosovo that were difficult to find. The BBC reported, "The general
blames the politicians for allowing public opinion to dictate military
strategy. He also blames the nature of NATO. 'This was my first time
available before bombing. They would not destroy a bridge that had any civilian vehicles
on it.
A German attorney said their military was very concerned about the political aspects
of targeting decisions; in part because of German actions during World War II. The
German people were very sympathetic to the citizens of Belgrade who lost their electric
power. The German JAG pointed out that the German military is probably close to the
U.S. in its targeting views, but the Germans would not destroy a water purification plant
used by both military and civilians.
A JAG from Australia said that military leaders must consider public opinion and
create policies that are supported by the public and troops. They did not want to kill
women or children or destroy illegal targets that would offend enemy civilian leaders. Any
bad press about targeting would affect Australian political leaders. The JAG pointed out
that political concerns and proportionality were more important in Australian analysis than
in U.S. analysis. The example we discussed was the power plant supplying military and
civilian users. The Australians would not destroy the plant, even though U.S. forces would
bomb it. The Australians would find a creative way to target the specific power
transmission lines supplying power to the military. The JAG also pointed out that
Australians were reluctant to strike bridges.
These comments highlighted and documented the problem of different interpreta-
tions of targeting and the Laws of War. See Ignatieff, supra note 144, at 30-34; Dales &
Eflien, supra note 126, at 5-6.
169. See Ignatieff, supra note 144, at 34.
170. Id. at 30-34. Gen. Clark's difficult target coordination may have led to a
recommendation in DOD's Jan. 1, 2000 After Action Report that DOD work to improve
the "NATO Political-Military Process." See Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action
Report, available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/readings/summary.
html (last visited Feb. 9, 2001).
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going to war with 19 partners.' he says, adding: 'It was war by the lowest
common denominator.
' ' '17
Dissention within NATO is a political problem that serves to limit
military options. It may also become a legal problem if the Law of War
changes the standards for bombing and those higher standards are
enforced in the International Criminal Court, or if NATO dissention is
used as evidence in the International Criminal Court of war crimes by
individuals.'
Friction in NATO may have been a reason for European Union (EU)
consideration of a 60,000-man rapid reaction force. If the EU has a
military force, they may not need to join future U.S. led coalitions. An EU
171. NATO Leadership Splits Revealed, BBC, Mar. 9, 2000, at 1-3, available at
news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_671000/671420.stm (last visited Feb. 9,
2001). BBC and Frontline reports show U.S.-U.K. tensions, because Prime Minister Blair
felt ground troops would be needed. Short said French pressure meant early bombing
campaign targets had no strategic importance. The requirement for all nineteen NATO
nations to agree meant they "were fighting a war by committee-and moving at the pace of
the slowest member." Other difficulties in NATO concerned letting Russian troops take
the Pristina airport. See also Frontline, War in Europe: NATO's 1999 War Against Serbia
over Kosovo, available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages (last visited Feb. 9, 2001) [hereinafter
War in Europe].
172. One of the most controversial Kosovo campaign targets was the TV station bombed
April 23, 1999. British attorneys argued the Geneva Conventions banned targeting
reporters or TV stations, so the British did not participate in the attack. French objections
to the target postponed the attack. A] Report, supra note 3, section 5.3. The bombing is
discussed in Final Report, supra note 5, at 18-21, but the committee did not recommend
further investigation. The attack is called a "war crime" by two of the people who
commented at the BBC site. Kosovo: Is NATO Guilty of War Crimes?, supra note 6.
Yugoslavia felt NATO leaders committed war crimes. See Yugoslavia Puts NA TO Leaders
on Trial, supra note 130; Hearing at Trial of NATO Leaders Starts, supra note 130. One of
the concerns about the International Criminal Court is that it might try American soldiers
for war crimes. Ambassador David J. Scheffer, Fourteenth Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in
International Law: A Negotiator's Perspective On The International Criminal Court,
Address Before 49th Judge Advocate Officer Graduate Course at the Judge Advocate
General's School (Feb. 28, 2001), in 167 MIL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2001). If the International
Criminal Court was fully operational before April 1999, and if President Clinton, Gen.
Glark or Gen. Short were indicted for the "war crime" of bombing the TV station, would
British and French military officers and attorneys be called to testify about their specific
objections? Would they be asked why they felt the attack violated International Law? We
should expect both France and England to cooperate with the court. France has ratified
the International Criminal Court treaty and the United Kingdom is "moving toward
ratification." Id. at 4. This hypothetical question is offered to show coalition dissention may
take on greater significance in the future.
173. See Douglas Hamilton & Charles Aldinger, Rival EU Force Could Hurt NATO,
Cohen Says: Secretary Says Alliance Could Become a Relic, WASH. PosT, Dec. 6, 2000, at
A28.
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force may make it harder for the U.S. to build future coalitions, especially
since NATO is not needed for its original Cold War mission. Adoption of
a target list by NATO nations before a conflict may reduce NATO
dissention during a conflict.
3. Slow Process
One of the problems in NATO operations in Kosovo and Bosnia was
the slow targeting process. General Clark's consultations with NATO
leaders over targeting for Kosovo operations are the most current
example. 74 It appears NATO is moving back to a version of the Vietnam
targeting process, with a myriad of slow steps and tight political control.
However, instead of the U.S. President exerting control of the operation,
NATO political leaders now fill that role.
Politics makes it hard to plan and run a war with nineteen partners,
each with a veto on targeting, tactics and rules of engagement, and each
with different political concerns at home.'75 Adding U.N. leadership,
174. "Clark often had to call Paris or Bonn to get European politicians or chiefs of staff to
agree to a particular strike .. . . When Clark found himself blocked politically, he would
ring up Javier Solana, the NATO Secretary-General ... and Solana would go to work on
the member state that was objecting." Ignatieff, supra note 144, at 34.
175. Changing NATO's voting rules could also correct the problem of a veto by a single
member. However, like the U.N., NATO rules are fairly well entrenched and stable.
General Short said of NATO politics:
The political constraints existed throughout the conflict. There were tar-
gets that individual nations would not let us hit, or wouldn't let us hit with
airplanes launched from their soil. There were targets that individual na-
tions would not hit themselves, but it was okay for somebody else to hit.
Apparently, and clearly, it was relayed to me that every nation had a vote
.... What I believe is unacceptable is for one nation to veto a target set
that other nations believe to be important, and then to say that no one can
strike it .... It allows the interests of one nation to outweigh the interests
of the alliance. The interests of the other 18 nations placed the air crews at
unacceptable risk, and, I believe, prolonged the war by keeping key target
sets off the table ....
U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen also saw a political limitation and said:
There were political constraints that precluded the air force from carrying
out and attacking those targets on a certain time frame. The problem was
the political restraints that were exercised by the various members of the
alliance.. .So we tried to be as aggressive as we could in saying let's move
as quickly as we can to get these various targets. But it was hard to get
that consensus until after the summit. We spent almost a month going
through this process whereby NATO has never done this before. And so
it was a real learning experience we had to go through in terms of getting
the consensus and running various targets by leadership.
War in Europe, supra note 171.
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control, coordination or supervision only complicates and slows the
operation. The chance of error is increased when decisions must go
through many layers, increasing delays, changes and refinements. When a
target is finally approved, information may be outdated and the target may
no longer be in enemy hands. Targeting delays hurt the effectiveness of
NATO operations and put NATO soldiers at risk. Targeting delays are a
military problem caused in part by the political process used to select and
approve targets.
4. Cost of Rebuilding Nations
Accidental bombings, such as the destruction of the Chinese Embassy
in Belgrade or the bombing of the KLA headquarters, can be very costly in
many ways. It can affect the public opinion of the war, and the interna-
tional relations of the warring parties with other nations and groups. 76
War has never been perfect; but, perhaps wars should be closer to perfect,
just because of the cost. After World War II, the U.S. Marshall Plan
rebuilt Europe, spending $17 billion. 7  In Bosnia, peacekeepers are
rebuilding war damage, at great cost, including damage caused by NATO.
In November 2000, the U.S. renewed relations with Belgrade and
promised to provide $45 million in emergency food aid." After many
conflicts, the U.S. will aid former enemy nations to rebuild. The U.S. ends
up paying for both the destruction and the renovation.
Because of the great cost of rebuilding, there is a strong argument to
focus on only purely military targets. If NATO destroys only military
targets, and refrains from striking "dual-use" targets, perhaps NATO will
have less to rebuild after the war. There can be strong public opinion
support to help a nation rebuild electric power plants and bridges, but less
support for rebuilding military radar sites, military bases, military airfields
and military headquarters. Creating massive destruction of civilian targets
also gives an enemy a propaganda tool to use against attackers.
176. See IGNATIEFF, supra note 159, at 102.
177. See 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 605 (1973). The Marshall Plan, or European
Recovery Program, aided seventeen West European nations. U.S. generosity is so
respected, it was satirically suggested that a nation should lose a war to the U.S., in order to
get the aid sent afterwards. See LEONARD WIBBERLEY, THE MOUSE THAT ROARED 20, 26-
28 (Bantam Books 1971); Leonard Wibberley, The Day New York Was Invaded,
SATURDAY EVENING POST, Dec. 1954-Jan. 1955.
178. See Yugoslavia Restores Ties to U.S., Allies, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2000, at A20;
Ceremony in Belgrade Formally Renews Relations with U.S., Others, DAILY PROGRESS
(Charlottesville, Va.), Nov. 18, 2000, at A6. The German attorney the author interviewed
pointed out that the European Union is also repairing or replacing all of the bridges blown
up in Belgrade during the bombing. See supra note 168.
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When faced with these dilemmas, perhaps the U.S. needs to be more
creative and flexible in its response to evil and warfare."' We are
essentially using the same bombing strategy that we started with in World
War I, refined in World War II and tested in the Gulf War."' Perhaps a
new strategy, such as a target list, can help guide us in future conflicts, to
make warfare quicker, more humane and more efficient. Perhaps we can
build NATO cohesion before the next war.
The high cost of rebuilding former enemies is an economic and politi-
cal problem. This problem may properly cause NATO and the U.S. to
review either their policies for targeting or the Laws of War for bombing
and consider other less destructive options in the future. A pre-approved
NATO model target list could be one way to reflect a new policy or
promote a change in the International Law, through state practice. 81
B. Adoption of 1923 Air Rules
Since the Wright brothers flew on December 17, 1903,"s there have
been two consistent trends in U.S. warfare. First, as it developed from the
first controlled flight to the ability to destroy cities, the U.S. has increas-
179. For an example of a creative new approach to bombing, see Col. Charles J. Dunlap,
Jr., The End of Innocence: Rethinking Noncombatancy in the Post-Kosovo Era, STRATEGIC
REV. 9-17 (Summer 2000) (His ideas are discussed in section III.C.).
180. Holland points out we have used the same strategic bombing strategy since World
War II. HOLLAND, supra note 40, at 39. However, our coalition partners sometimes limit
US.
181. Every conflict is different and limitations on targets to minimize rebuilding must be
done with common sense. NATO may be able to limit bombing to "purely military" targets
in conflicts such as Bosnia and Kosovo. These conflicts did not directly threaten any
NATO nation and NATO had a vast advantage in military power. However, contrast those
conflicts with the Gulf War, when a coalition fought a large Iraqi military force. In the Gulf
War, a wider range of targets might be appropriate, besides just "purely military," even if
the coalition tried to limit damage to minimize rebuilding. An overall strategy of limiting
damage to minimize rebuilding would have been almost impossible for either the Soviet
Union or Britain in World War I[ because of the limits of bombing accuracy and the fact
that they were fighting a war of survival against a powerful enemy. If NATO adopts a
policy of limiting destruction to "purely military" targets whenever possible, it should serve
to help maintain the public opinion of NATO, enhance NATO member nation
cooperation, reduce dissention within NATO, speed military targeting decisions and make
rebuilding quicker and less expensive. A NATO policy of limiting destruction to "purely
military" targets could also serve to maintain flexibility in international law. NATO could
argue that a voluntary policy of limiting destruction is in effect a "Rule of Engagement"
and not a reflection of NATO's interpretation of international law. NATO nations could
point out that International Law allows a wider range of targets, but NATO is using
"humanitarian restraint" whenever possible. This restraint should not then be used to limit
bombing of appropriate lawful targets in future conflicts.
182. See WORLD ALMANAC supra note 142, at 520.
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ingly used aircraft as a weapon."" Second, the U.S. seldom fights without
allies. The key U.S. ally now is NATO, composed of multiple individual
allies. NATO nations should adopt Articles 22 through 24 of the 1923 Air
Rules as a basis for future bombing operations. NATO may also consider
revisions to account for changes in war.
If the U.S. and NATO adopt these rules, they can build international
law through practice and custom, while encouraging others to adopt the
same rules. The U.S. is the most powerful military nation now, and usually
works with NATO, the most powerful military alliance. The U.S. and
NATO are in the best position to build positive custom in the international
Law of War. There are many reasons for adopting these rules now.
By applying a consistent set of targeting guidelines for all U.S. and
NATO operations, NATO can reduce criticism of the targets selected and
be proactive in world public opinion. The 1923 Air Rules severely limit
the legality of dual use targets. The target list in Article 24(2) is strictly
military in nature. This will eliminate some criticism. Article 24(3) and
Article 24(4) ban indiscriminate bombing and require a proportionality
analysis. These rules can also prevent some criticism as they also limit
attacks to purely military targets. Because the U.S. has precision
munitions, the U.S. would often be able to bomb more targets than other
nations, thus maintaining flexibility through the U.S. technological
advantage.
Additionally, if the U.S. and NATO consistently follow the same
rules, they will build consensus towards opiniojuis. This gives the U.S. and
NATO the opportunity to write international law through consistent and
fair application of uniform standards in this area. Any critics will be forced
to challenge an accepted position, NATO's unified legal front.
If NATO works consistently with the 1923 Air Rules, there will be a
ready answer to critics: 'All of the NATO nations have agreed to a unified
humanitarian approach to bombing and apply that same approach.
NATO's approach is completely consistent with current international law
and the standards written in 1923.' NATO will be able to set and enforce
one standard. To work toward that standard, NATO might even consider
getting the aid of the ICRC or the U.N. If NATO adopted the 1923 Air
183. See BUCKLEY, supra note 3, at 220; 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 449 (1973). Since
Vietnam, U.S. aircraft were used in Grenada, Panama, the Gulf War, Bosnia and Kosovo.
Gulf War air strikes lasted from January 17 until February 28, 1991. The ground war was
only from Feb. 24-28, 1991, because of the effective air war. See ANDREWS, supra note 115,
at 28-71. In 1999 Kosovo operations, victory was won without sending in ground troops,
after a seventy-eight day bombing campaign. Grier, supra note 142, at 16; Wedgwood,
supra note 142, at 828.
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Rules with the concurrence of the ICRC or the U.N., then those organiza-
tions could help promote a unified world standard.
NATO unity is a key foundation. It is counterproductive to have
different standards. If France or Britain or other NATO partners will not
strike the same targets as the U.S., this allows for dissention and conflict
within the alliance. Dissention allows NATO's enemies to further use
public opinion and the media to reduce NATO resolve and ability to
respond in a timely manner to crisis.
Having one unified standard will also speed targeting decisions. If the
1923 Air Rules are adopted, NATO commanders, units and legal advisors
could train and exercise with the same standards and a unified list. This
will make real world targeting quicker. The specific rules will make some
targeting decisions much simpler. A unified rule should also help reduce
the political nature of targeting. Targeting might be able to move towards
a logical objective military discipline, and away from a politically charged
and difficult subjective consensus decision.
Adopting and using the 1923 Air Rules will also improve one part of
warfare, the rebuilding. As modern nations rebuild their defeated
enemies, the 1923 Air Rules can be a real advantage. If NATO and the
U.S. limit attacks to purely military targets, and avoid "dual-use" targets,
there would be less to rebuild. If NATO destroys military barracks, and
headquarters and factories, there may be no urgent need to rebuild those
after the war. However, if NATO bombs water purification plants, power
plants, communications centers and other dual-use targets, there can often
be an urgent and compelling need to rebuild those facilities, at great
expense. NATO destruction of a food warehouse has great propaganda
value for the enemy. But, destruction of weapons storage facilities is less
likely to sway public opinion or cause dissent within NATO.
Is it possible to remove all criticism from targeting? Is it possible to
totally remove targeting from the influence of politics? No! However, we
can and should improve our means and methods of war as much as
possible and consider new ideas to do so.
There are many reasons why the 1923 Air Rules can work today.
First, attorneys and military advisors already negotiated the rules, so there
has already been input from those two groups. Second, the rules were
agreed to by the delegations of six nations, five of whom are in NATO
184. Arguably, all of the NATO nations work from the same standards now, but with
different interpretations. A specific target list could reduce the room for confusion or
alternative interpretations.
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today, and the last is a leading world economic power.' 85 This can be a
strong foundation for getting the 1923 Air Rules adopted today. Third, the
rules can be a starting point for an agreement within NATO to have all
NATO operations controlled by one set of rules; regardless of the rules of
engagement or treaty obligations of the individual NATO nations. This
avoids any disagreements over Protocols I and II. Fourth, using one set of
rules will avoid the problem of nations who have signed on to a coalition
later declaring that missions violate international law. Fifth, adopting the
rules now and considering revisions will build NATO cohesion now and
for future coalition conflicts.
An alternative is to have NATO adopt the 1923 Air Rules as a matter
of policy, and use the target list and guidance from those rules. NATO
could use the target list for "police actions" or other minor interventions,
while keeping the flexibility to return to the status quo ante. This would
give NATO the benefit of working from a strong unified front, limiting
dissention and building cohesion while also reducing the damage that
needs to be rebuilt after the conflict. However, if NATO or any NATO
members needed to change their policy to meet a larger threat, they could
do so without violating international law.'6
C. Why 1923 Air Rules Are Better Than The Status Quo
The 1923 Air Rules were not adopted by any nation. Some see them
as "an authoritative statement of the law as it then existed, 18 7 while others
call them a failure.'8 8 The rules may have made a "significant contribution
to the development of the modern rule of proportionality., 8 9 But others
185. The U.S., France, United Kingdom, Holland, and Italy are all NATO members. In
1996, Japan had the third highest national gross domestic product in the world. See WORLD
ALMANAC, supra note 142, at 113, 866.
186. This is using the 1923 Air Rules as "Rules of Engagement" for bombing campaigns.
If a nation follows Rules of Engagement, they are not creating new international law and
can change their policy at any time as long as they are consistent with international law.
Rules of Engagement may show the level of force used or the constraints set by political
concerns or military reasons such as the economy of force. ROGERS, supra note 20, at 58.
187. MCCOUBREY, supra note 20, at 28. The draft has "the authority which the eminence
of the jurists who prepared it naturally conferred upon it. Undoubtedly it has had influence
upon the practice of belligerent and neutral Governments since the date it was formulated."
SPAIGrr, supra note 69, at 42-43. The rules are a "useful guide to contemporary thinking
about the state of customary law and have been described as persuasive authority in the
context of land warfare." ROGERS, supra note 20, at 51. The rules are important to clarify
and formulate the laws, but parts "appear rather rudimentary and are subject to serious
doubt, at least from today's perspective." Fleck, supra note 57, at 43-44.
188. Parks, supra note 22, at 31.
189. Gardam, supra note 57, at 400.
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doubt they "have seriously influenced belligerent practice on any critical
matter''19 or see a "utopian quest to prohibit effective weapons or ban
war." 191 Perhaps the most specific criticism is by W. Hays Parks. He called
the rules a "total failure" and "unsuccessful" in drafting language
"applicable to all nations, under all circumstances, and that would not
provide a tactical or strategic advantage to one nation over another, nor
establish rules for aerial bombardment that are fundamentally different
from those applicable to land-based artillery or naval gunfire."' 92
Regardless of Parks' criticisms, the 1923 Air Rules are a valuable Law
of War statement that can and should be adopted today. The current U.S.
method of selecting targets is to analyze each for military necessity,
humanity and proportionality. The U.S. uses a broad definition of
necessity and strikes "dual use" or "mixed use" targets that some of our
NATO allies will not attack.
The current U.S. method of targeting may be summarized as "every-
thing may be destroyed if there is a military reason to destroy it." The
targeting analysis considers the principles of humanity and proportionality
and considers specific places are protected, such as churches, hospitals, and
historical and cultural places. However, in this inclusive analysis,
everything starts as a potential target.
193
In the current U.S. analysis, a military headquarters is a target be-
cause destroying the enemy military will help our military succeed.
However, the U.S. may also target the entire infrastructure that supports
that headquarters, such as roads, communications systems, and power and
water purification plants. If the roads, communications systems, or power
or water purification plants also serve civilians, these "dual-use" items
remain valid targets because destroying them will affect the enemy
190. STONE, supra note 64, at 609.
191. Jochnick & Normand, supra note 3, at 83-84. Jochnick & Normand say the jurists
put "excessive faith in the power of positive law, they drafted rules that placed unprece-
dented limits on sovereign power and prohibited any effective use of aircraft in war." In
1925, Elbridge Colby, wrote of the rules, "[wie cannot put too much trust on rules." Colby,
supra note 46, at 715. Colby quotes J.M. Spaight's comment that "[i]n air warfare more
than in its elder brethren of the land and sea, the heart and conscience of the combatants
are the guarantee of fair fighting, not any rule formulated in a treaty or in a manual." Id.
192. Parks blamed the "failed" rules on "international lawyers exercising the lead in
negotiating a treaty in which they lacked subject-matter expertise." Parks, supra note 22, at
76 (his 225-page article discusses the 1923 rules on pages 24-37, 71, 76, 103, 138, 164, & 224).
His specific criticisms will be discussed later.
193. This description of U.S. targeting is an oversimplification to contrast the current
regime with the 1923 Air Rules.
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military.' 94 The U.S. may also destroy any possible alternative sources of
communications, power and water, to ensure the enemy military
headquarters is isolated without support from the alternative sources. If
the U.S. wants to isolate an enemy's military forces, it may destroy the
main transportation routes used by the military and any possible secondary
or alternate routes. The U.S. will often destroy routes that the enemy
military has not yet used. The current U.S. targeting regime is "inclusive"
and flexible in that almost everything starts as a potential target if there is
any reasonable military necessity to destroy it.' 9'
In contrast to the current U.S. analysis, the 1923 Air Rules may be
seen as inflexible and exclusive. Both sets of analysis consider military
necessity. The 1923 Air Rules focus on military necessity in Article 24(1).
But, the 1923 Air Rules become both inflexible and exclusive in Article
24(2) when the rules say that if there is a military purpose "[siuch
bombardment is legitimate only when directed exclusively at the following
objectives: military forces; military works; military establishments or
depots; factories containing important and well-known centers engaged in
the manufacture of arms, ammunition or distinctly military supplies; lines
of communication or transportation used for military purposes."'% The
listing of specific legitimate targets is effectively a short exclusive list that
limits the consideration of "dual-use" targets.)9
Because of this language and the list under the 1923 Air Rules, only
the military headquarters and the lines of communication and transporta-
tion actually used by the military may be destroyed in the example. The
attacker may not destroy the water purification plant or power plant used
by both the military and civilians. The attacker may not destroy lines of
communication and transportation that are not used by the enemy.
This example shows how modern U.S. practice may be seen as "inclu-
sive" and flexible, while the 1923 Air Rules are "exclusive" and perhaps
inflexible in limiting what may be considered legitimate targets. This
limitation is an advantage. It should make targeting easier and quicker,
while often limiting targets to those that should involve the least effect to
enemy civilians and the least possible negative public opinion. The
legitimate targets allowed by Articles 22 and 23 of the 1923 Air Rules are
194. "Dual-use" refers to possible targets that support both military and civilian
infrastructure.
195. Compare this simplified version of the U.S. view with the comments by foreign JAGs
in footnote 168.
196. See 1923 Air Rules, supra note 4, art. 24. (emphasis added).
197. Perhaps the only "dual use" targets are factories that produce military and civilian
items, and lines of transportation and communication used by both the military and
civilians.
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primarily items that need not be immediately rebuilt after a war, except for
possibly the lines of communication and transportation.
While U.S. analysis may be inclusive and the 1923 Air Rules are ex-
clusive, they both still have the foundation of military necessity. The
definition of military necessity in the 1923 Air Rules is similar to the
definition in Protocol I, Article 52.98 Protocol I has been ratified by most
NATO nations; however, France and Turkey have not ratified it, and Italy,
Holland and the United Kingdom have minor reservations about Article
52.9 The U.S. accepts that many parts of Protocol I represent interna-
tional law, and signed but never ratified the treaty. If NATO and the U.S.
adopt the 1923 Air Rules, the U.S. can possibly avoid some of the
unresolved issues of U.S. concerns with Protocol I and work from a clean
slate.
The "clean slate" of adopting the 1923 Air Rules will remove many
"dual use" targets from consideration as targets. People see the U.S. view
of targeting "dual use" facilities as providing flexibility in war. A criticism
of the 1923 Air Rules is that it limits military objectives and legitimate
targets to a "nation's military effort rather than its war effort."20 0 The U.S.
198. Article 52 - General Protection of Civilian Objects:
1. Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civil-
ian objects are all objects which are not military objectives as defined in
paragraph 2.
2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as ob-
jects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which
by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutrali-
zation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
advantage.
3. In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to
civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or
a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military ac-
tion, it shall be presumed not to be so used.
Protocol I, supra note 27.
199. Id. Italy's concern is that "the military advantage" gained from an attack should be
considered when looking at the whole attack and not isolated parts. Italy, Holland and the
United Kingdom point out that an area of land can be a proper military objective. Italy
also points out that the first sentence of paragraph 2 "prohibits only such attacks as may be
directed against non-military objectives. Such a sentence does not deal with the question of
collateral damage caused by attacks directed against military objectives." Id. Holland and
the United Kingdom raise a concern that commanders have to make decisions based on the
best knowledge available to them at the time.
200. Parks, supra note 22, at 138. Parks may "represent" a U.S. military view of the 1923
Air Rules and Protocol I because he is Chief, International Law Team, International
Affairs Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Army and because his
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wants to strike "target systems" or a broader range of targets that
contribute to a nation's ability to wage war, not just the direct functions of
a nation's military forces. However an analysis of the 1923 Air Rules
shows why they are acceptable, appropriate and better than the status quo
of U.S. targeting.
The U.S. generally disagrees with the concept of a target list because
it is too limiting or does not allow the attack of target systems. 20' The
current U.S. strategy is to use air attacks to destroy "centers of gravity."
Centers of gravity are concentric rings representing key areas of the
nation. The outer ring is the fielded military forces. Moving inward, the
other rings are population, infrastructure, key production or system
essentials, and leadership. Air strikes are often directed at the command
and control of the leadership level, because that is the key to controlling all
other parts of the model. This U.S. targeting and planning strategy was
illustrated in the 1991 Gulf War.203
The 1923 Air Rules focus on striking military targets. Article 22 of
the 1923 Air Rules bans bombing to terrorize civilians, to destroy or
damage private property not of military character, or to injure non-
combatants.4 The prohibitions in this article seem consistent with recent
U.S. practice. The U.S. does not intentionally do what Article 22 prohibits
unless there is a valid military purpose for destruction of private property.
But the U.S. and NATO could be creative within the limits of the 1923 Air
Rules. One option is to focus only on military targets, as in the 1923 Air
Rules, while working on other diplomatic measures or with ground and
naval forces. Another option is to be creative with precision weapons.
Instead of striking a power plant that supplies hospitals and the military,
just strike the specific transformers and lines that supply the military. Or
completely destroy the military facilities so they don't need or use power.
article was presented in The Air Force Law Review. See id. But see Matheson, supra note
136 (for a morc official analysis).
201. See Yoram Dinstein, The Thirteenth Annual Waldemar A. Soilf Lecture in
International Law, Address Before 48th Graduate Course at the Judge Advocate Gepcral's
School (Mar. 1, 2000), in 166 MIL. L. REv. 93, 104 (2000); Parks, supra note 22, at 138.
202. See Lt. Col. Robert D. Pollack, Roads Not Taken: Theoretical Approaches to
Operation Deliberate Force, in DELIBERATE FORCE: A CASE STUDY IN EFFECTIVE AIR
CAMPAIGNING, supra note 119, at 435.
203. See REYNOLDS, supra note 114, at 16-19; WARDEN, supra note 110, at 39-40, 53-58,
129 (1988) Warden discusses targeting and air power. Early in the Gulf War, he wrote
specific air campaign plans that were adopted as the air battle plans. Reynolds explains the
planning process and Warden's work.
204. This is consistent with Protocol 1, supra note 27, arts. 51-52.
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As already noted, destroying dual use targets can have a negative affect on
civilians and public opinion.
Do civilian targets have a value? Parks says in "land and naval war-
fare, destruction of civilian objects was regarded as lawful as a psychologi-
cal means for impressing upon an enemy nation the prudence of surren-
der."2 5 In the Civil War, General Sherman believed in causing economic
hardships to those who supported the enemy. In the era of "total war"
many air power theorists felt the morale of the enemy was an essential
206target of air power and bombing. The argument is that a brutal war may
be quicker, forcing surrender and discouraging future wars.
The brutal warfare perspective ignores history. The U.S. has not gone
to war against a democracy since the Civil War, a unique conflict. When
the U.S. bombed Yugoslavia, Iran, or Nazi Germany, those nation's
citizens did not have the freedom to vote their leaders out of office and the
leaders ran the wars. Milosevic was only removed by an election and riots
well after the Kosovo conflict was over. Hitler avoided assassination
attempts and Hussein remains in power.
Perhaps the brutal warfare perspective or the focus on civilian morale
can be combined with the use of precision weapons for a new strategy.
Perhaps dictators should be the focus of precise bombing raids and attacks
to force surrender. Air Force Colonel Charles Dunlap discusses this as a
paradigm for the future. He says in Kosovo, Milosevic surrendered
"because of the impact on the Serb people" when NATO hit Belgrade's
power supply, bridges and military headquarters. Dunlap has historical
examples of democratic nations devastating an "evil" nation and
destroying the enemy's hostile spirit, with relatively few casualties. 2°7 He
recommends a "new paradigm" of war directed at the civilian objects,
especially luxury objects, of an enemy nation, to stop and discourage the
"perpetrators of violent, misogynic policies." For example, NATO might
have struck at Milosevic's bank account, destroyed banks and financial
institutions, and perhaps even struck important cultural or religious
buildings. Factories and stores "that produce, sell, or distribute luxury
products or, indeed, anything not absolutely indispensable to noncombat-
ant survival, might be wonderfully rewarding targets."208
205. Parks, supra note 22.
206. See BUCKLEY, supra note 3, at 74-82. See HOLLAND, supra note 40, for Sherman's
views and for those of Trenchard, Gorrell, Douhet and Mitchell, see sources cited, supra
note 76.
207. Dunlap, supra note 179, at 13-14. His examples are Epaminodas in Sparta, General
Sherman's cut through the heart of the Confederacy, and General Patton's campaign
through Germany.
20& Id. at 14.
20021
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
Dunlap's ideas are creative and make sense on one level. It would be
logical and humane to use a new kind of campaign focused on a dictator-
ship's elite leadership. NATO could limit collateral damage by using
"smart" weapons and could announce which cities, areas or targets might
be attacked each night, so civilians could evacuate. This kind of an attack
would encourage powerful government leaders to stop the war because of
their own direct personal interests. This kind of air campaign would have
the potential to stop the violence in Kosovo, without killing those in
Kosovo we wanted to help. These ideas are a way to apply the principles
of humanity and unnecessary suffering in new and unique ways.
While these new ideas have potential, there are many limiting factors.
NATO members can't agree on the Laws of War now. It could be hard to
get agreement on a radical new strategy. In some cases a strong leader can
motivate his citizens to withstand bombing or could even use enemy
attacks to build citizen support of the war against the enemy.' °9 Also, the
effect of this strategy may depend on the dictator's strength or personal
greed. If Milosevic was greedy and wanted to protect his property, or was
weak and felt the push of the opinion of the leadership level of the
population, he might cave in. However, Hitler or Saddam Hussein may
have had enough brutal control of their nation to hold power for a long
time. Of course, in the Gulf War, this strategy would allow the Coalition
forces to destroy Hussein's many palaces and homes. Perhaps such a
direct attack on his quality of life would have ended the war sooner.
Perhaps a strong leader in NATO, such as a Winston Churchill or
FDR, could make Dunlap's concepts work. But, it seems few leaders in
recent years are willing to boldly step forward and do what is right in the
most difficult international situations. Leaders often seem more
209. A survivor of the Battle of Britain told the author that Prime Minister Winston
Churchill inspired the people to fight on, despite the bombing. Initially, the German bombs
felt heaviest in and near poor neighborhoods, which caused some dissention among the
lower classes. But, then a bomb fell at one of the King's palaces and all of the population
was united to resist together. Interview with Phillip Anns, Charlottesville, Virginia (Spring
2001).
210. It would have been wonderful for a world leader to say,
The killing in __ [put in Rwanda, Bosnia, or Kosovo] is evil and can-
not be allowed. I am sending our military to end this genocide now. Lo-
cal authorities can comply or be replaced. I regret that many will die in
this noble effort. But, it is the right thing to do, and they will die for a just
cause. We welcome allied help, but are starting now, before more are
murdered. Thank you.
Instead of forceful direct action in those three areas, we were overly concerned about
preventing any deaths of our citizens and allowed slaughter and rape of thousands or
millions of others.
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responsive to public opinion and polls. Dunlap's new strategy could
involve going against national or world public opinion, or perhaps a leader
would need to convince the public and other national leaders of the
211humanitarian nature of the new strategy.
Dunlap's strategy would be counter to the general protections of
civilian property. This restriction is in Article 22 of the 1923 Air Rules.
Article 22 reflects much of what NATO does now, or could be seen as an
appropriate pronouncement of a NATO consensus and a proper
codification of air war rules.
Article 23 also reflects the current U.S. practice of warfare. Article 23
of the 1923 Air Rules bans bombing to enforce compliance with requisi-
tions or forced contributions. Such actions would be condemned as
blackmail or extortion today and are unnecessary because in some cases
assets can be seized. Article 23 reflects current practices and is proper for
NATO and world guidance for air war.
Article 24 starts with a concept key to U.S. warfare, the definition of
"military necessity." Article 24(1) limits bombing to targets with a military
objective, the destruction of which gives an attacker a military advantage.
This reflects current practice and law. Critics point out that a strict reading
of Article 24(1)-(4) would limit bombing to the battlefield and prohibit
bombing weapons factories or civilian factory workers.112 Article 24(2)
says bombing "cities, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings not in the
immediate area of ground forces is prohibited."
There is no definition in the 1923 Air Rules of "not in the immediate
area of." Certainly, the area contemplated is beyond the battlefield but
near the battlefield. However, this article may require interpretation
through use. Should military supplies 25, 50 or 100 miles from the front be
destroyed by air? Perhaps today's modern transportation technology will
require an expanded understanding of where military targets may be
bombed in relation to their proximity to the battlefield to apply this
section. Perhaps the use of precision weapons should be an argument to
expand the area considered in the area of ground forces. Another option
is to warn the enemy of any attack that is not proximate to the battlefield.
As modern warfare uses more missiles and remote aerial vehicles, a
warning may not necessarily place any personnel in danger, even if it
reduced the element of surprise.
211. Dunlap's strategy may or may not affect the cost of rebuilding after a war. Luxury or
recreational property may not be urgently needed after a war and might not need to be
rebuilt at all. The strategy also may require an expanded definition of "military necessity"
because rather than attacking a target for a military purpose, the attack would be against
the leadership elite's property.
212. See Parks, supra note 22, at 32-33.
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Warnings can also be used when considering the question of civilian
factory workers. Attacking forces might warn the enemy of the attack or
bomb at night to reduce civilian casualties.
Parks has concerns about Article 24(2) and how it relates to targets
and civilians. He argues Article 24(2) is so restrictive that many lawful
targets from World Wars I and II would be unlawful under Article 24(2).
He says the following World War I targets would not be allowed: "an
aqueduct; blast furnaces; electric works; gas works; iron works and
foundries; magneto works; motor works; steel works; and petroleum, oil
and lubricant production, manufacturing, storage facilities. 2 14 Addition-
ally, Article 24(2) ignores the role of civilians in the enemy's war effort.215
Parks' agenda is to allow the military to destroy as wide a range of
targets as possible. This is unnecessary. Article 24(2) focuses attacks on
military targets, military forces, military supplies, military factories, and,
communications and transportation used for military purposes. This is a
wide range of appropriate targets. If interpreted with reason and
judgment it need not be unfairly limiting. However, the focus on
"military" will remove some dual use targets from consideration, especially
when the Article 24(2) list of targets is read with the language of Article
24(1) saying that the object's destruction must "constitute a distinct
military advantage to the belligerent."
While Article 24 will limit targets, Parks is focusing on World Wars I
and II. Those wars, in addition to Korea and Vietnam, were measured in
216years. But, most recent conflicts are measured in days or weeks.Because of the short conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq, there would be
213. This guidance is in Protocol I, supra note 27, art. 57. In France in World War II,
people were warned in radio broadcasts that the Allies would bomb factories. In Japan,
when possible, people were warned to evacuate cities before incendiary raids. CRANE,
supra note 76, at 43, 133. In Korea, U.S. forces dropped leaflets before an August 1950
campaign, to reduce casualties. HOLLAND, supra note 40, at 32. In Vietnam, before
attacking civilian urban areas, the U.S. often warned with leaflets, loudspeakers or other
means. Humphries, supra note 3, at 29. Israel used leaflets in 1982 to warn of bombings in
Lebanon. Parks, supra note 22, at 165. Leaflets were used in the Gulf War to demoralize
enemy soldiers, to warn them of B-52 raids, and to encourage them to surrender.
ANDREWS, supra note 115, at 26-27, 41.
214. Parks, supra note 22, at 33.
215. Id. at 34.
216. See WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 142, at 527. The U.S. attack on Grenada lasted
just a few days. Id. The invasion of Panama was over when Gen. Noriega surrendered
fourteen days after the attack. Id. The Gulf War was forty-two days; Bosnian campaign
twenty-one days; and Kosovo campaign was seventy-eight days. Id. Vietnam and the
Somalia aid operation may have quelled any appetite in the U.S. for a long war. Id. At the
same time, U.S. military power is a unique deterrent. Id.
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no reason to bomb steel mills, civilian factories or motor works. If the U.S.
bombed armament factories, we could cut off the production of weapons
without destroying steel mills. Our usual complete air supremacy lets us
strike most targets at will and repeatedly. So, we could strike any rebuilt
armament plants. 7
If the U.S. destroys the armament factories, and they are not in
production, there is no reason to destroy the steel mills. If the U.S.
destroys the military factories, and they are rebuilt in fortified structures,
or are rebuilt in hidden unknown locations, then the steel mills may be the
only appropriate way to strike and destroy the "military" industry that is
supplying an ongoing war effort. The enemy is only leaving one available
target with any military value. The enemy has turned the steel mill into a
target that has a more direct military advantage, and perhaps made it the
only target available to destroy to limit weapons production. If the U.S. or
NATO were involved in such a situation, they should argue that the
enemy, by its action has thus converted a "dual use" target into a more
important and proper "military" target that should be bombed.
The difference between this analysis and the status quo of U.S. bomb-
ing is that in the present U.S. analysis, all dual use targets are almost
always proper targets if they have any military purpose. In the above
analysis, based on the 1923 Air Rules, striking the steel mill would only be
a last resort that should only be allowed because of the enemy's actions to
turn the steel mill into a "well-known center" building "arms, ammunition
or distinctly military supplies."
Of course, when a conflict starts, it is impossible to predict how long it
will last. If a war starts, the U.S. should focus on striking "military" targets
first. However, if a war goes past months and into years, there may be
good reasons to attack the steel mills that supply the military industries,
depending on the facts of the conflict.
There is a similar analysis for "fungible" supplies such as oil. The
analysis is to always strike the military resources first. Both civilians and
the military can use petroleum products for vehicles. If the U.S. strikes the
lines of transportation used by the military, the military forces may be
isolated and immobilized. In Bosnia, a mountainous nation, destroying
key bridges can isolate military vehicles. The U.S. could destroy the
military vehicles and military depots or military oil storage locations. If
these actions stopped military movements, then there would be no reason
to destroy civilian oil products and storage facilities.
217. The language of Article 24(2) allows bombing "factories containing important and
well-known centers engaged in the manufacture of arms, ammunition or distinctly military
supplies." 1923 Air Rules, supra note 4.
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However, if the U.S. has struck lines of transportation used by the
military, military oil storage and military vehicles, but the enemy military is
still mobile, then civilian oil products and storage may become a proper
military target that should be destroyed as a last resort. The oil could be
properly destroyed once the military started using it, because then it would
become part of a military depot or military supplies. Oil and other
fungible commodities may belong to enemy civilians. However, once they
start getting diverted for military use, these items become proper targets.
This is also a consideration with lines of transportation and communi-
cation. If the U.S. destroys roads used by the enemy, they may just turn to
other routes, water transport or rail. However, Article 24(2) focuses on
lines of transportation actually used by the military. If the lines are used,
they are proper targets and probably should be considered as possible
targets. If they are not used by the military, then there would be no
military purpose served by their destruction. Current U.S. targeting
practice is to quickly destroy all lines of transport and alternative routes.
The military purpose of attacking civilians is a hard problem. It has
been suggested that if a civilian is driving an enemy military vehicle, then
the U.S. or NATO should target the military vehicle and not the civilian.
If the civilian is killed, they are a victim of "collateral damage" but we are
not targeting them.218 Of course, civilians are essential for the war effort.
They have to provide so many things to support any military, such as food,
water, supplies and weapons.
While civilians are important to support a nation's war, morality
becomes a key factor. Does any individual civilian support the war? Do
they support the war because of national propaganda? Are they forced to
support the war with their work because it is a dictatorship? We can ask
the same questions about the military. If we kill the military in the field,
are we killing evil people who hate freedom, democracy and us? Or are
we killing conscripts forced to fight for their country? Are we killing adult
soldiers or children soldiers?
When facing these difficult legal and moral questions, the compromise
of targeting the military targets and not the civilians makes sense.
However, once the military targets have been destroyed, the enemy
military may then take civilian resources or routes and convert them to
military use. At that point, those converted materials and routes would
become proper military targets. This is the key difference between the
218. Protocol I, Article 51 protects civilians from attack unless they take part in the
hostilities. Therefore, they should not be targeted, but the military vehicle they drive can
be targeted. The civilian driver's potential death should be considered when doing the
proportionality analysis. ROGERS, supra note 20, at 8.
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status quo of U.S. targeting and Article 24 of the 1923 Air Rules. The
status quo of U.S. targeting wants to target alternate routes and alternate
supplies immediately. Under the 1923 Air Rules, the civilian supplies and
routes should not be struck until the military takes them over or uses them.
There is seldom a good reason to target a civilian or their property,
unless we can destroy an evil leader as the head of the enemy's military.
The only other exception would be Dunlap's idea of striking civilian luxury
items and wealth, however, the Laws of War are not that developed yet.
Article 24(3) limits bombing and protects civilians in another way.
Bombing of "cities, towns, dwellings or buildings not in the immediate area
of operations of land forces is prohibited." Even if there are proper
targets in the cities, towns, dwellings and buildings, and the targets are in
the immediate area of the operations of land forces, the targets may not be
bombed if it causes the indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian
population. This might be seen as an effort to restrict air warfare to the
same range as naval gunfire or land artillery: to keep the devastation of
warfare close to the front lines of the battlefield. Of course, this would ban
"area bombing" or bombing attacks designed to affect the morale of the
people.
Morale warfare is a difficult topic. I respect Dunlap's arguments that
the will of a people to go to war may need to be destroyed, such as
Sherman's march to the sea. However, this is an area of mixed results in
history. The morale of the German people in World War II was not
affected enough to "win" the war. German forces had to be defeated, and
Hitler had killed himself, before Germany surrendered. Bombing in
Vietnam did not cause North Vietnam to give up. In some cases, a brutal
dictator may have enough power to hold control, regardless of the
suffering of their people, or bombing may stiffen an enemy's resistance.
There is a strong humanitarian argument to be made that in war we
should destroy luxury property to cause an enemy nation to stop an evil
act. However, this is an area where law needs to develop. It is unlikely
there can be any good consensus for coalition operations in this kind of
strategy. This may be something that the U.S. needs to test first, alone
against an enemy. However, my focus here is on coalition operations,
because that's where the U.S. has predominately fought in wartime in the
recent past.
Most agree it is wrong to target cities, towns, villages, dwellings or
buildings. We should target military objectives and not try and destroy the
morale and lives of civilians, because it is wrong and reprehensible to do
so, and also because it is ever more costly to rebuild the destroyed enemy
afterwards if we have ruined their civilian infrastructure. There is often no
need to rebuild a destroyed enemy's military, but we may feel compelled
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by humanitarian motives or public opinion or self-interest to rebuild their
infrastructure, bridges, highways, homes, schools, churches, hospitals,
businesses and civilian industry.
The rest of Article 24(3) says that when proper military targets are
near the operations of land forces, the targets may not be bombed if it will
cause the indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian population. This
part of Article 24(3) makes more sense now than ever before. Because of
precision weapons, we can strike targets with greater and greater accuracy,
reducing collateral damage. Of course, nothing is perfect and there will
always be collateral damage. But, the focus in this area is still on the intent
of the attacker. If U.S. forces thought they were striking a proper military
target, but blew up the Chinese Embassy because of bad intelligence: we
focus on their intent. The U.S. was not involved in indiscriminate
bombing.
Incredible advances in reconnaissance have accompanied the great
development of precision weapons. Satellites for navigation and
reconnaissance have helped with finding targets, planning attacks, striking
targets, and battle damage assessment. These advances have removed the
need to burn down large areas to hurt an enemy's industrial base. We can
now selectively amputate the military factories and buildings and plants we
need to destroy. We can put a bomb in the middle of a bridge, with a low
margin of error. Our increased accuracy means we can focus even more
selectively on purely military targets and accomplish our mission. The
advent of satellite technology and precision munitions has made the 1923
Air Rules more relevant today than they were when written.
Article 24(3) does not ban bombardment in towns; it limits any such
bombing to prohibit indiscriminate attacks and to keep the attacks near
the operations of land forces. It is a part of the 1923 Air Rules that makes
much more sense today than it did when it was first written. Our
technology has advanced so far that this article is completely appropriate
to our weapons and technology.
Attackers are also not restricted to using "smart" weapons. There are
other options to protect civilians and avoid indiscriminate bombing.
Attackers can warn the enemy of an attack and ask the civilian population
to move from areas near military targets. This is often an appropriate step
to protect the civilian population, but sometimes attackers are unwilling to
risk giving advance notice because it places bomber crews at greater risk.
However, if the attacker has reasonable accuracy and has warned the
enemy, there should be limited loss of life from collateral damage. The
attacker should make the warning loud and clear. This will reinforce the
duty of the defender and civilians to protect civilian lives.
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Article 24(2) is a target list, restricted by Articles 24(3) and (1). The
U.S. has been reluctant to accept the idea of a target list. Professor Yoram
Dinstein points out the U.S. "has consistently adhered to the position that
the best thing to do is not have a binding list of legitimate targets for aerial
attack.''21" The U.S. concern is that things change and if the U.S. wanted to
bomb some target not considered in the past as valid, and not on the list,
the U.S. would be prohibited from striking it.
20
Dinstein points out that while this seems a valid argument, in fact the
reverse has been happening. After each war, something the U.S. felt was a
proper target has been removed from the list of accepted targets. After
the World War II use of strategic bombing, Protocol I, Article 51(5)(b)
and the further development of proportionality have taken this type of
target away, and Dinstein says, "today, the bombing of Dresden would
have been in breach of international humanitarian law."22 It would also be
a violation to consider a wide area, such as the industrial area of the Ruhr,
as a valid target for bombing.22 Some specific targets, such as dams, dikes
and other installations, were allowed in World War II. But now it would
be improper to strike them under Protocol I, Article 56(1).223 It would also
be improper to use defoliants, as the U.S. did in Vietnam. 24
Dinstein shows that while the U.S. is against the idea of target lists as
being too narrow and limiting in the future as things change, we have in
fact lost several previously valid targets. In the Kosovo conflict there was
criticism about the U.S. bombing bridges. In the future, the world
community may remove bridges and other items from the realm of
219. See Dinstein, supra note 201, at 104.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 105. The bombing of Dresden would also be prohibited by the 1980 Protocol
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol ILL). The U.S.
has not ratified this protocol, but does not object to it, and the President sent it to the
Senate with a reservation that incendiary devices might be used when they cause less
collateral damage than conventional weapons. An example might be that it is preferable to
burn down a chemical weapons plant and destroy the weapons, than to bomb it with
explosives and spread the weapons over a large area. So, Dinstein points out that
incendiary weapons attacks, such as the bombing of Tokyo and Dresden, would also be
prohibited under modern law.
222 Id. at 106.
223. Note that the U.S. has reservations about Article 56. Matheson, supra note 136, at
426.
224. See Dinstein, supra note 201, at 106. Defoliants are prohibited by the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-21, 1974
U.N.T.S. 3.
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previously proper targets. 22 Dinstein concludes, "the best thing for the
United States is to proceed to producing a binding list .... All that is
required is an open-ended enumeration of military targets that can be
revised and updated in the years ahead., 26 If the U.S. starts the discus-
sion, it may have some control or influence on how it turns out.
227
Dinstein's argument for target lists is completely consistent with adop-
tion of Articles 22-24 of the 1923 Air Rules. These rules contain an
enumeration of targets. Since any list must be applied with common sense
and judgment, this is a great start. Because the nature, weapons and
strategy of war change, any list may need to be revised. However, after
about 100 years of aircraft technology, it is time to have some specific rules
on how to properly use this weapon.
In the development of the Law of War as it applies to ground, naval
and air warfare, proportionality has been an important concept. This is
expressed in Article 24(4) of the 1923 Air Rules. This article allows
bombing of cities, towns, villages, dwellings and buildings in the immediate
area of land forces when there is reason to believe that the military forces
are strong enough to justify the danger to civilians.
This article makes sense when considering the dangers and realities of
urban combat. If attackers are to take over a well-defended city, the battle
will often move from house to house, block to block and street to street.
There may be no way for attackers to take the city without bombing, and
possibly the use of land artillery and naval gunfire. Article 24(4) is also an
appropriate codification of the Law of War consistent with current NATO
practice.
225. It is ironic to note that Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, allows the striking of both bridges and "the
installations of broadcasting and television stations." Had the U.S. ratified Protocol I, it
might use this target list from the commentary as an indication that it was proper to target
the station and bridges. Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, reprinted in W. Hayes Parks, Air War and the Law
of War, 32 A.F. L. REv. 1, 139 (1990).
226. Dinstein, supra note 201, at 107.
227. id. Because the U.S. is "fortress America" and the leader in many world military
actions, it should consider a list. The U.S. will be the leader but "[t]here is no alternative to
military alliances, and they imply coalition warfare." Id. at 108. The U.S. may be much
better off to start and possibly control or guide the debate on target lists, than to
continually have targets removed from the "acceptable" list. Dinstein says of the U.S. and
target lists, "[b]y being more pro-active, it can impact on international legal thinking and on
the formation of legally binding roles that might prove more amenable to American needs."
Id.
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D. Adopt 1923 Rules and Add Other Lists For The Future
Because warfare changes, adopting Articles 22-24 of the 1923 Air
Rules can only be a start. However, it could be done in several different
ways. NATO nations could adopt the 1923 Air Rules as "rules of
engagement" for minor conflicts or "police actions." This would allow for
the creation and testing of a bombing list in coalition operations. If the
1923 Air Rules work well, the experiences in small conflicts may well
prove that the rules can be effective in larger wars.
While using Articles 22-24 of the 1923 Air Rules in small conflicts
would be a small step, it would be a start. Then military and legal experts
can build from that foundation. We should consider revisions, alternate
lists and alternative strategies. For example, when a nation can show it
would be best to attack with the "Dunlap Plan," then they would bomb
targets consisting of civilian luxury property. This type of warfare would
be to protect human lives by destroying property that is not essential for
humans, to compel a nation to do what is proper, correct and moral under
international law. This could be a modern version of a "reprisal."
To advance the principles of humanity, necessity, distinction and
military necessity, there will be other ideas worthy of consideration. There
will always be other creative things to improve the Laws of War, if we are
open-minded. Our open mindedness must of course be tempered with the
realization that it can be difficult to get our allies to agree.
The development of the airplane and weapons and tactics for the
airplane have advanced much faster than the Laws of War to control them.
It is disappointing no specific treaty or convention exists yet to control this
incredible weapon. Articles 22-24 of the 1923 Air Rules can be a proper
foundation for continued moral and legal development.
Both weapons and war change. The U.S. has not faced a war with
large armies on the field where the security of the U.S. mainland was
threatened for over 130 years. Perhaps rules should be different for
warfare when one side has an overwhelming advantage. Certainly the
rules should not place U.S. military members in greater danger or risk
their lives. However, perhaps the future Law of War should serve to
control the level of destruction the U.S. or a coalition brings onto a weak
enemy nation and their people.
IV. CONCLUSION
Aircraft are an incredibly powerful and flexible weapon. We can
destroy an entire city or cities with just one aircraft and strike anywhere in
the world from the U.S. However, in the history of the aircraft we have
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not yet developed specific uniform rules in the international Law of War
for how to use this weapon. It is time to correct this deficiency.
In light of the difficulty of getting international treaties and conven-
tions completed, NATO nations should agree to Articles 22-24 of the 1923
Air Rules as rules of engagement for small conflicts. This will allow for the
development and testing of target lists. This small first step can be the
start of a greater uniformity among the nations of this powerful alliance,
and of the world.
Uniform guidance will build greater cohesion within NATO and let
NATO plan for future wars and select targets quicker and with less
dissention. It will reduce criticism from the world media and international
organizations; criticism that can so terribly harm public opinion and
support for NATO actions. Uniform rules will make NATO more
effective and efficient as a military organization as it faces future conflicts.
The recommended uniform rules of Articles 22-24 will also focus bombing
on military targets and reduce the need for and amount of rebuilding after
the bombing.
Articles 22-24 of the 1923 Air Rules are appropriate for how NATO
fights today, and today's technology, and would be an effective first step at
testing and setting proper international law controls of the use of aircraft
in war. While Articles 22-24 would be a great foundation, it can only be a
foundation. As we use aircraft in future wars, new tactics and weapons
and situations will require new laws and rules. However, the world still
needs that foundation in the Law of War on the proper use of the aircraft.
If Articles 22-24 of the 1923 Air Rules are effective as rules of en-
gagement for small conflicts, then perhaps NATO nations can adopt them
for larger conflicts and consid$ a treaty incorporating these rules into
international law for the future.
tttAuthor's Note: This article was written before the recent war in Afghanistan. That
conflict is unique in so many ways that it will be difficult to judge at this point how it will
influence the development of the Law of Armed Conflict.
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HAGUE IX - ARTICLE 2
Military works, military or naval establishments, depots of arms or war
[material], workshops or plant which could be utilized for the needs of
the hostile fleet or army, and the ships of war in the harbour, are not,
however, included in this prohibition. The commander of a naval force
may destroy them with artillery, after a summons followed by a reason-
able time of waiting, if all other means are impossible, and when the
local authorities have not themselves destroyed them within time fixed.
He incurs no responsibility for any unavoidable damage which may be
caused by a bombardment under such circumstances.
If for military reasons immediate action is necessary, and no delay can
be allowed the enemy, it is understood that the prohibition to bombard
the undefended town holds good, as in the case given in paragraph 1,
and that the commander shall take all due measures in order that the
town may suffer as little harm as possible.
Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, Oct. 18,
1907, art. 2, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 207 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri
Toman eds., 1988).
PRIME MINISTER NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S JUNE 21, 1938 COMMENTS TO
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
In the first place, it is against international law to bomb civilians as such
and make deliberate attacks upon civilian populations. That is un-
doubtedly a violation of international law. In the second place, targets
that are aimed at from the air must be legitimate military objectives and
must be capable of identification. In the third place, reasonable care
must be taken in attacking these military objectives so that by careless-
ness a civilian population in the neighborhood is not bombed. .. We
cannot too strongly condemn any declaration on the part of anybody,
wherever it may be made and on whatever side it may be made, that it
should be part of a deliberate policy to try and win a war by demoraliz-
ing the civilian population through a policy of bombing from the air.
That is absolutely contrary to international law.
Neville Chamberlain, Comments to the House of Commons (June 21, 1938), in J.M.
SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS 257 (3d ed. 1947).
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1923 AIR RULES - ARTICLES 22-24
Article 22. Aerial bombardment for the purpose of terrorizing the
civilian population, of destroying or damaging private property not of
military character, or of injuring non-combatants is prohibited.
Article 23. Aerial bombardment for the purpose of enforcing compli-
ance with requisitions in kind or payment of contributions in money is
prohibited.
Article 24 (1). Aerial bombardment is legitimate only when directed at
a military objective, that is to say, an object of which the destruction or
injury would constitute a distinct military advantage to the belligerent.
Article 24 (2). Such bombardment is legitimate only when directed
exclusively at the following objectives: military forces; military works;
military establishments or depots; factories constituting important and
well-known centers engaged in the manufacture of arms, ammunition or
distinctly military supplies; lines of communications or transportation
used for military purposes.
Article 24 (3). The bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings or
buildings not in the immediate neighbourhood of the operations of land
forces is prohibited. In cases where the objectives specified in para-
graph (2) are so situated, that they cannot be bombarded without the
indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian population, the aircraft must
abstain from bombardment.
Article 24 (4). In the immediate neighbourhood of the operations of
land forces, the bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings or
buildings is legitimate provided that there exists a reasonable presump-
tion that the military concentration is sufficiently important to justify
such bombardment, having regard to the danger thus caused to the
civilian population.
Hague Rules of Air Warfare, Drafted by A Commission of Jurists at The Hague, (1922-
1923), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLiCTs 207 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri
Toman eds., 1988).
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LEAGUE OF NATIONS ACTION OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1938
The Assembly,
Recognizes the following principles as a necessary basis for any subse-
quent regulations:
(1) The intentional bombing of civilian populations is illegal.
(2) Objectives aimed at from the air must be legitimate military objec-
tives and must be identifiable.
(3) Any attack on legitimate military objectives must be carried out in
such a way that civilian populations in the neighborhood are not
bombed through negligence.
Excerpt from Protection of Civilian Populations Against Bombing From the Air
in Case of War, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 221 (Dietrich Schindler
& Jiri Toman eds., 1988).
SIR MALKIN'S RULES
Air bombardment is only legitimate in the following circumstances:
(1) Against warships, including transports and fleet auxiliaries, at sea;
(2) On land, in accordance with the following rules:
Any objective on land which may legitimately be bombarded under the
rules applicable to land warfare, may be bombarded from the air if it is
within the range of medium artillery, which for this purpose should be
taken as ten miles from any of the forces of the belligerent who effects
the bombardment or his allies.
In addition, the following objectives on land may be bombarded, pro-
vided they are either anywhere on territory occupied by an invader or
within a radius of fifty miles of the nearest troops or air forces of the
belligerent carrying out the bombardment or of his allies:
(a) Enemy troops and air forces:
(b) Ammunition dumps, military supply depots, artillery parks and
similar well defined aggregations of distinctly military equipment,
stores, or supplies:
(c) Supply columns and other means of transport which are engaged in
transporting supplies to or from the depots etc. mentioned under (b).
A committee chaired by Sir William Malkin wrote these rules. They are quoted in W.
Hayes Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REv. 1, 43-44 (1990).
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COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 - TARGET LIST
1. armed forces, including auxiliary or complementary organizations,
and persons who, though not belonging to the above-mentioned forma-
tions, nevertheless take part in the fighting;
2. positions, installations or constructions occupied by the forces ... as
well as combat objectives (that is to say, those objectives contested in
battle between land or sea forces, including airborne forces);
3. installations, constructions and other works of a military nature, such
as barracks, fortifications, War Ministries (e.g. Ministries of Army,
Navy, Air Force, National Defense, Supply) and other organs for the
direction and administration of military operations;
4. stores of arms or military supplies, such as munition dumps, stores of
equipment or fuel, vehicles [sic.] parks;
5. airfields, rocket launching ramps and naval base installations;
6. those of the lines of communication (railway lines, roads, bridges,
tunnels and canals) which are of fundamental military importance;
7. the installations of broadcasting and television stations; telephone
and telegraph exchanges of fundamental military importance;
8. industries of fundamental importance for the conduct of the war:
a. industries for the manufacture of armaments such as weapons, muni-
tions, rockets, armoured vehicles, military aircraft, fighting ships, includ-
ing the manufacture of accessories and all other war material;
b. industries for the manufacture of supplies and material of a military
character, such as transport and communications material, equipment
for the armed forces;
c. factories or plant constituting other production and manufacturing
centres of fundamental importance for the conduct of war, such as the
metallurgical, engineering and chemical industries, whose nature or
purpose is essentially military;
d. storage and transport installations whose basic function it is to serve
the industries referred to in (a)-(c).
e. installations providing energy mainly for national defence, e.g. coal,
other fuels, or atomic energy, and plants producing gas or electricity
mainly for military consumption.
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9. installations constituting experimental, research centres for experi-
ments on and the development of weapons and war material.
W. Hayes Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 138-39 (1990).
"CUSTOMARY PRACTICE" AND U.S. AIR FORCE TARGETING RULE
COMPARED
Parks compares "Customary Practice" and Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 200-17, An
Introduction to Air Force Targeting (23 June 1989) in allowing the targeting of the
following items:
Customary Practice AFP 200-17
Military equipment, units and bases Military forces, equipment and facilities
Economic targets Economic targets
- power sources - industrial complexes
- industry - production facilities
- transportation 
- transportation
Command and Control Leadership targets
- government centers (political)
- military headquarters
W. Hayes Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 144 (1990).
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